## CHAPTER II

# IDEOLOGICAL EDUCATION AND MORAL EDUCATION

## INTRODUCTION

The triumph of Confucianism in the Han dynasty can be seen from two aspects: its glorification and its domination. For certain motives (political, cultural, religious, educational and economic, etc.), Confucianism was adopted to defend the social status quo, to maintain social order, and to cultivate human nature. For this fateful multi-dimensional power Confucianism was glorified by the intellectuals (Shih) as a form of ideology (Ru-chia sz-hsiang) and by the ordinary people as a religion (Ru-chiao). When ideology and religion combined, Confucianism enjoyed unparallel spiritual as well as political power, and the absolute domination of Confucianism in Chinese history (though challenged at times by Taoists and Buddhists, and later by Christianity) is the logical consequence. As a dominant force, it tends to dictate, manipulate and transform the whole life-world and life-view. Authoritarianism, dogmatism and dictatorship were all aspects of this domination. More exactly, as ideology and religion, Confucianism transformed its own doctrines into morality, and then, morality into canon law. Loyalty, obedience, rites-observance and filial duty have been both norms and dogmas ever since. Needless to say, Confucianism determined also politics, aesthetics and even economics.

This chapter concerns particularly the process of the transformation of Confucianism from a philosophy of life into an ideology and religion that have determined the features of current moral education in China. Its aim is to reveal the hidden essence of Chinese education through a critique of this ideology. Thus, it seeks to understand the ideological aspects of moral education in order to remove its mystical shell. To rediscover the rational kernel of moral education, authentic Confucian humanism must be clearly distinguished from Confucianism as a form of ideology.[1] These questions will be treated through both an analytic and a synthetic approach.

In the first part, current moral education is diagnosed from three aspects: policy, method (didactic) and application. No difference appears between moral education, citizen-education,

patriotic education and national education.[2] The method of teaching and learning bears, in many aspects, the characteristics of the past, i.e., it is mimetic, uncritical, passive and dogmatic; its application is ambiguous and disoriented. All in all, moral education has been radically transformed from the noble cause determining human nature to a sheer instrument. From another point of view, however, this moral education registers a remarkable success: it helps the State in keeping social order, in maintaining the *status quo* of society and in uniting the nation. The second part aims at clarifying this contradiction whose essence lies in the ambiguity of moral education as a form of ideology. Thus, this part deals with ideology, whose main characteristics as they are used to defend the cause of the state or class-interests are instrumental and purposive reason. The third part attempts to dissociate moral education from ideological education by a critique of ideology. It critically reviews some ideas of Juergen Habermas and Lawrence Kohlberg, which can contribute to a discussion of moral education in general, and to a rethinking of Confucian moral education in particular. First, Habermas's theory of human interests as the basic characteristic of human nature and his theory of consensus and communicative action as a mode of resolving interest conflicts are worthy of careful study. Though this may be insufficient, its value and definitive contribution to understanding morality is undeniable. Second, Kohlberg's theory of moral development, an application of Jean Piaget's theory of cognitive-psychological development, also deserves attention. Though somewhat materialist and mechanical, it should not discourage us from a careful evaluation on its merits, for this theory brings out the notion of responsibility and helps us rethink moral education. Finally, in a manner that is less dogmatic and ideological, Confucian morality will be rethought with its original insistence upon the central role of persons and their interaction within a totally integrated structure of man, world and God, and upon the dynamic development of social man after the model of nature. This contrasts to the ideological, static and dogmatic understanding of humankind found in most followers of Confucius.

## CONTEMPORARY MORAL EDUCATION

Even before Premier Lee Kwan-yew of Singapore declared the need for moral education,[3] China had practiced it more rigorously than any other country. In over two thousand years, moral education had been *de jure* and *de facto* the only thing taught or permitted to

be taught in Chinese schools. Moral codes were identified with juridical laws, while politics was synonymous with the art of applying these moral codes to social life.[4]

Far from being irrelevant then, the warnings of Lee and leaders in Taiwan seemed instead to touch but the tip of the iceberg. The increase of crimes, egoism, materialism, a-patriotism[5] and the like revealed a sad fact: moral education, even if it was still included in the school; was losing its credibility and remained only as a footnote to Chinese culture. Its central role had been assumed by technology and the economy. The onslaught of the sciences, ironically by Hu Shi,[6] casts morality in an anti-progressive role; *de facto*, it is dead. The reasons for such moral decadence are believed to be matters of recent history. Some blame the poisonous effects of Western culture, such as selfishness, irresponsibility and materialism;[7] others blame the ineffectiveness of teachers and parents; still others blame the devastating consequence of technological development. In short, one blames everything which happens to be related to modern life. Most of our time and resources are spent in issuing declarations and warnings. Finally, to calm our consciences, we make some cosmetic changes such as upgrading techniques in teaching and learning, or substituting some modern themes. Yet it seems the official efforts have touched only apparent, phenomenal and less significant problems. While wasting mountains of paper for very little progress, they leave the *status quo* and the *modus vivendi* of the kernel of moral education policy untouched. The illusion that some new ideas imported from the Western countries, e.g., the U.S., and the upgrading of some techniques can solve the problems can be seen in the government prepared text-books.[8] The naive belief that with economic and scientific progress moral problems might become non-existent turns out to be destructive. The whole problem is, in the expression of Max Horkheimer, that we do not recognize the constructive and destructive elements of our educational system.

The Enlightenment sought by Hu Shi is also an anti-enlightenment.[9] The politics that relied on technique as an effective instrument for seizing and maintaining power, described by Niccolo Machiavelli and adored by our modern politicians, has destroyed the traditional politics built upon morality. '*Wang-dao*' or the royal and moral way of governance, so important for coping with modern techniques of seizing power, is forgotten and replaced by '*ba-dao*' (the art of usurping power, or the amoral way of governing). In a word, politics appears as a sheer instrument or tool as does morality which once was regarded as the scope of human life. It is sought

only when politics and technology are overwhelmed by human problems. Thus, to tackle this problem, we need to look deeply into moral education, i.e., our policy, our method of teaching and learning, and finally the way of applying moral principles to individual and social life.

## PRESENT POLICY IN MORAL EDUCATION

First, it must be noted that though, etymologically, citizen-education differs from moral education, today they are almost synonymous in educational practice in China. Such other terms as national education and patriotic education have more or less the same meaning. The purposes of moral education articulated by the authorities are to promote:

- Perfection in education
- Harmony in society
- Right in the legal system
- Democracy in politics
- Prosperity in the economy, and
- Harmony in culture.[10]

A quick glance at the content of the text-book shows unmistakably that moral education: serves as a means to protect the State, to safeguard the social order, and to develop the country; it aims at cultivating a model individual created by the State (useful, patriotic, moral), and preserving the traditional values; and it functions as the best means for preserving and promoting Chinese identity.

### *Moral Education for the State*

The idea that morality aims at making man better is universal and as old as human history. Confucians regarded morality as the sole way to transform human nature. In *The Great Learning*, Confucius was totally convinced that morality alone best serves mankind and its world: "The way of learning to be great consists in manifesting clear character, loving the people and abiding in the highest good."[11] Although one might question the meaning of morality as expressed by Confucius, one could not deny the fact that after Confucius morality became the most important, if not the only, way of governing. In *The Great Learning*, Confucius describes politics in eight steps: investigating things, extending knowledge, sincerity

of will, correction of the mind, cultivation of one's personal life, ruling one's family, national order and world peace.[12] A careful look at these steps shows morality to be the cornerstone of politics.[13]

After Confucius, the belief that morality is the metaphysical principle of politics became undisputed, unquestioned and unchallenged dogma. This transformed Chinese culture into a moral culture and Chinese politics into the moral art of governing (*wang-dao*). Peace and prosperity, humanity and love, order and rites are possible only if we possess morality.[14] This dogma was so forceful and fateful that Confucians and Neo-Confucians have done no more than interpret and rearrange it in various manners. Chu-Hsi (1130-1200) for example, rearranged the text and placed 'the investigation of things' in the first place, while Wang Yang-ming (1422-1529) insisted on the correction of the mind and sincerity of will as the most important principles.[15] They all share the view that these eight steps are indispensable for politics.

Although we are not in a position to determine clearly whether or not Confucius himself understood morality as the unique means for political life, it is commonly accepted that fundamentally morality is the ideal means. The text in *The Great Learning* clearly indicates that by correcting oneself one can rule one's family; by ruling one's family, one can govern the State, and so on. However, this does not establish whether moral conduct is for the sake of the State or the world; morality is the best means for both. The confusion between means and ends, and the ambiguity in the sequence from the individual to the State and back to the individual, were used extensively in favor of the State. Han Fei-tzu, for example, by developing this idea, transformed morality into a kind of national law, the purpose of which was to defend the regime or State. Instead of morality, laws were taken as the best available means to serve state purposes. Han Fei-tzu argued that "the people's nature is such that they delight in disorder and do not cherish the law,"[16] and that the "ruler in the end will be able to prove to them that their own long term interests will be served best by a system based upon a draconian code of penal law."[17] His arguments sound like Hsun Tzu, famous for his theory that human nature tends to evil. This violent interpretation of morality in terms of law did not do justice to Confucius himself, who often regarded morality as higher and more noble than laws. Morality is for *chun-tzu*, the noble man, while laws are for ordinary people. Accordingly, laws or *fa* are not patterns forced on men;[18] they play only a secondary role when morality does not prevail.

Mencius interpreted Confucius rightly when he wrote: "Noble

men will violate the penal laws."[19] However, Mencius did not take pains to make a clear distinction between morality and law. He often complained of the insufficiency of morality and his remark that "virtue alone is insufficient for ruling; the laws cannot carry themselves into practice,"[20] suggests that basically morality and laws have a similar instrumental character. Han Fei-tzu, in this respect, asserted the roles of law and morality in the same manner. Benjamin Schwartz rightly observed:

> In the book of Han Fei-tzu, one even discerns the outlines of an ultimate utopia lying beyond the more immediate goals of the legalists' program. Once the laws and the methods of rational government have become internalized in the habits of the people, the old dysfunctional attitudes based on belief in 'private action' (*Ssu hsing*) will disappear. The irrelevancies of the cultural heritage with its stress on personal morality, the proud adherence of the wandering philosophers to their own inane 'private doctrines' and private values, private vendettas and 'private warriors' will have disappeared and the 'public interests' (*kung li*) will reign supreme. Peace, harmony, and general welfare will prevail.[21]

In brief, the instrumentalization of morality was taken as a matter of fact. Max Weber's description of rationalization in Western culture had taken place in Chinese history long before. Thomas Hobbes's definition of politics as an art of the matter, form and power of a commonwealth, his understanding of human behavior as the material for sciences, are not new to the legalists who had practiced Machiavellian *Realpolitik* long before. Well-known principles in *Il Principe*, such as "All human beings are ungrateful, fickle, hypocritical, cowardly and selfish,"[22] or "politics is the art of governing men (Menschenfuehrung) or the science of domination" were familiar to the legalists. In short, with the legalists, moral education was also an art of governance analogous to politics and laws.

This historical fact explains why three quarters of the content of the textbook on moral education deals precisely with politics and laws. It explains also how the overtone of politics in moral education is accepted as undisputed, justified, rational and thoughtful policy. Lee Huan, a former Minister of Education of Taiwan, stated bluntly:

Education is the fundamental and most important factor in constructing the Nation, and citizen-education (moral education) is the most essential of the many kinds of education. It can determine our success or failure, i.e. the fate, of our Nation. We must unite all the resources and powers of the people in order to survive. (Therefore) citizen-education needs to be upgraded in order to make our nation stronger. Our most important task now is to upgrade, to better citizen-education.[23]

With equal vigor, Chu Huei-shen, another former Minister of Education, traced the main lines of moral or citizen education as follows: 1) based upon morality or *wang-dao;* 2) aimed at democratic life, at respecting the national laws; 3) helps the young generation acquire more scientific knowledge; and 4) contributes to the improvement of the livelihood of the people.[24] Chen Li-fu, president of the *Confucius-Mencius Society,* insists upon citizen or moral education as the unique means for the survival of the Nation.[25] Those directives are executed literally and so effectively that one can hardly detect its artificiality. One gets the impression that moral education might be based completely on Confucian ethics, which turns out to be accurate if one understands Confucianism as a form of ideology.

*Moral Education and the Chinese Model-man*

The second character of moral education is seen in its goal of building a model man. Even if individuals are suppressed, some room is still made for them; however, it is necessary to note that the Chinese individual described in the textbook is a 'social individual'. The second and third volumes of the six-volume textbook reserve a great part to individuals, instructing the student on becoming a great citizen, a model student, a filial son or daughter, a responsible man or woman.[26] In short, the individual is mentioned in terms, not of the individual, but of his or her family, society and nation. What the authorities mean by individual is not synonymous with the solipsist romantic ego broadly assumed in Western culture. The Chinese individual is neither the center nor the starting-point of society, but a member or co-maker, living with others in society. One's life is determined by one's family and society to which one has responsibility. The concept of man (*jen*), for example, describes the social character of the person in terms of responsibility and communication.

Of course, in *The Analects*, one can detect some clues pointing to a certain type of individualism,[27] and in *Shi-King* or *The*

*Book of Poetry*, one finds some similar passages. But this kind of individualism must not be understood in the sense of Kantian autonomy[28] or Hegelian self-consciousness, which expresses an individual who possesses a spiritual self-sufficiency which renders him independent of 'popularity' or dependence upon others. Thus, it has little to do with what is meant by an individual in Western culture. The Chinese individual is self-sufficient in virtue, but not in terms of sociality. What the official textbook stated concerning the individual is really the person of universal character required by Chinese society: a person with wisdom, responsibility, loyalty, politeness, filial piety, success and, today, technical knowledge. Moral education is supposed to help the student to become such a person. Thus, in the first two volumes, though many chapters deal with the ideal individual, nothing is left to the individual as such. The first chapter of the volume deals with the four main benefits of education, of which only one is related directly to the individual as such:

- it gives the knowledge (technical ability) indispensable for survival;
- it develops human capabilities;
- it instructs concerning the way of acquiring wisdom (the art of living); and
- it is the best means of realizing individual ideals.[29]

The other, more important, benefits from education are for society, the State, and the world. Careful reflection upon the first individual benefits shows that it concerns an individual preparing for society. Morality, technology, knowledge, etc., primarily benefit one's family and the State. The third point, for example, which deals with the art of living (*dao-li*), is unmistakable: "Education instructs man on how to acquire wisdom (*dao-li*): the individual cannot be independent from society. He must share his life with others. Only when he understands this art of living (*dao li*), can he live peacefully and harmoniously with others."[30]

From the above analysis, one can describe education in its own Chinese expression of *Chiao yu* as the best means to teach and to raise students to become model persons.[31] According to these descriptions, one can describe the characteristics of a model person as follows:

- patriotic, altruistic and responsible (vol. I)
- possessed of knowledge and technical ability, useful to the

society and the State (vols. I and V)

- law abiding and ready to fulfill one's duty to the State, and to defend its interests (vols. III and IV)
- a person of moral integrity, who strictly observes traditional values (loyalty, filial piety, benevolence, etc.) (vols. II, III and VI), and who maintains social order.
- one who puts the interests of the state prior to his or her own interests (vols. I and II).

In short, the ideal person as described in the textbook is conservative in a strict sense. He does not blame others but accepts his fate and fulfills his duty.

*Moral Education or the Ideology of Chinese Identity*

The public authorities in Taiwan attend to traditional culture for a number of tactical reasons.

- The emphasis upon Chinese culture has a less ideological tone, but more effective result. It is commonly accepted as the unique factor which could unite the Nation and preserve Chinese identity.[32]
- It is designed as part of a policy against factors blamed for destroying Chinese culture and promoting internationalism.
- Chinese traditional culture is rich in morality. Thus, preserving the culture means respecting the social order, family structure, etc.

*Culture and Chinese Identity*

In all six volumes, culture is often mentioned under various forms of morality, laws and knowledge. The particularity of Chinese morality and laws is traced to the distinctiveness of Chinese culture as the most rich and most profound in terms of history and knowledge. Thus exaltation of Chinese culture is necessary for restoring Chinese identity. After the political, military and scientific failure of the Ching dynasty, a great number of Chinese lost faith in China. The mass exodus of Chinese to Western countries, disarray and disorientation, lack of self-identity and a self-defeatist attitude were the main causes of Chinese humiliation by Japan and Western colonialism.

These symptoms have by no means disappeared. The brain-drain,[33] lack of self-assurance, fetishism of science and commerce,[34]

etc., which are born of such defeatism could cause more harm. Thus, restoring culture is identified with restoring Chinese identity. The stories of Chinese heroes are rewritten in a more patriotic and cultured manner; Chinese culture is exalted in such terms as "Chinese culture aims at humanism and spiritualism, while Western culture aims at materialism."[35] History, geography, philosophy and literature are rewritten in this context.[36]

*Culture and Ideology*

In Taiwan the effort to restore Chinese culture was at first propaganda against communism (Ministers Lee and Chu), but later became a means for unifying China. Culture here being understood as traditional morality and social order, e.g., the virtues of obedience, piety, respect, reverence for Confucius, etc.

*Culture and Morality*

For lack of clear demarcation between culture and morality, morality is often taken for culture. Indeed, besides art, the rest of Chinese culture is identified with moral teaching. Thus, the teachings of Confucius, Lao Tzu, Buddhism, etc., constitute the central body of Chinese culture.

All in all, the exaltation of culture transforms it into a kind of ideology. In fact, *The Three Principles of the People,* written by Sun Yat-sen , are often described as part of Chinese culture and *vice-versa,* or rooted in Chinese culture. This theory was the main ideology of the Republic of China and its ruling party, which it has considered the key to the success of the economy and living standard of Taiwan.

## THE METHOD IN MORAL EDUCATION

*The Facilitation of the Student's Understanding*

Even when the language used is simple and brief and many arguments and examples are given, what counts is the content. This may be too difficult for first or second grade students. Metaphysical theories concerning human nature are explained superficially; theories of politics are abbreviated into a single sentence. Simple language does not mean that the readers can understand; on the contrary, even philosophers and scientists experience difficulty in

reading so simple a book as *The Three Characters Book*.[37] The reason is that it does not take account of the capacity for understanding on the part of the students.

*The Ability and Understanding of Teachers*

There is a lack of statistics or answers relating to this problem.[38] All textbooks used in the secondary and even in the primary schools are written by the university professors who habitually write the textbooks in a quasi-academic manner.[39] Though experts in their own fields, as they have no pedagogical experience in the schools their language is often too difficult, even for secondary school teachers. Further, the training of these teachers is often inadequate. The majority of the teachers have studied *The Three Principles of the People*, which trains them in different matters, but is insufficient for self-reflection. Their lack of philosophical training (logic, systematic and critical thinking, history of philosophy, etc.) makes it difficult for them to understand theories written in too concise a manner.

*Logic and System*

On the whole, it is true that the book is arranged in a relatively systematic fashion after the model of *The Great Learning*, going from individuals to society. But many arguments are insufficiently convincing because: 1) the examples given are too few and, at times, irrelevant, 2) the tone is always affirmative (dogmatic), and 3) the logic is often tautological.

For lack of experience in secondary schools, high officials and university professors[40] are ineffective in reforming the method of teaching morality. What remains are cosmetic changes, while the traditional spirit of teaching remains intact.

In the past, children were expected to repeat what the teachers said; repeating and copying were synonymous with learning and were fundamental characteristics of traditional education. This begins with the way the children learn reading and writing. The system of Chinese characters does not promote the child's ability to think. What they need to do is to copy exactly, to write the exact number of strokes of a character: the more faithful they are, the better they achieve. There is no question, wonder, critique or remark, but only memorization and imitation. As the best students are those who can memorize all the characters without missing a stroke, from

the first year in elementary school to the last year of high school (and probably in university), the mark of a student depends upon his memory. Homework and cram-schools are designed to help the students to repeat and memorize all the material asked in examinations. No wonder even creative work like the arts is understood in terms of copying. Thus, though the method of teaching and of learning is upgraded, it is only a cosmetic change which helps the children memorize more easily or pleasurably. Video-systems, photos, maps, stories, etc., are widely used for this purpose. In a word, memorization as a method remains; only its techniques are updated. This fact can be verified in the textbook and by the way in which a teacher executes his or her duty:

- all texts and arguments are descriptive in style,
- all explanations are simple and condensed,
- expressions are affirmative with hardly an hypothesis or question,
- teachers have only a few references to literature,
- as the content of moral education is too rich and the time allowed is too short, teachers can only do their best to repeat the text and force the students to memorize.
- There is no discussion or question and answer forum (this fact pleases both teacher and students: the former need not spend more time for research, while the latter prefer having fewer items for examinations).

This method of teaching is the best and the most effective way to get through all the examinations, up to those for college entrance. In short, students and even teachers are treated like machines or computers who need only reproduce exact solutions, and the above method is best for transforming students into such computers. It is normal to see students who can go through complicated mathematical sequences without understanding their process,[41] while others score high marks in an English examination (TOEFL) without being able to speak, write or understand that language when spoken.

Finally, the content is too abstract to understand. In the past, children began to learn metaphysics (the nature of human beings) even before they learned reading and writing. No wonder we still see these theories, rewritten and rearranged in a more attractive manner in the textbook. We do not need to repeat other shortcomings of this method already discussed by other scholars. What we do

wish to say is that this kind of method is born within an ideological structure and preserved by dogmatists, and that it is the most conservative method and does more harm than good.

## THE PRACTICE OF MORAL EDUCATION

Moral education is emphasized partly because of the increase in crime, especially among teenagers, which can threaten social stability; partly as a component of an ideological campaign; and partly for the sake of national identity. As we already argued, it takes little account of individuals. It is directed first toward the stability, order and progress of the nation, secondly toward unifying and fighting an ideology, and finally toward the growth of individuals.

Moral education is quite successful in furthering patriotism. It gives people more confidence in China, makes the students more obedient and loyal, helps to curb the crime rate (though there is a lack of statistics or results to verify this claim), and contributes to keeping the traditional family in order. In these respects, moral education has reason for claiming to be necessary. But there are also many reasons for worry: an increase in crime especially among white-collar workers (i.e., those receiving more education),[42] the brain drain, the lack of interest in the national cause, individualism, and the danger of losing Chinese identity by accepting the so-called "Americanisation."[43] These maladies come, not only from our policies and methods, but even more from their application, which manifest the following difficulties:

- the content of moral education is too difficult or too ideal
- it is also too abstract
- its method is anti-scientific and against human growth
- the policy and sequence of moral education are ambiguous and beyond the reach especially of children, who have no idea of politics.

The most serious problem, however, is the disunity between theory and practice.[44] The changing character of our society and the relevance thereto of these theories and of traditional virtues have not been studied. In other words, the micro and macro sociological facets have not been thought through.

All these shortcomings force us to reflect upon the nature of ideology, which we consider to be the key to understanding moral education and its importance.

## MORALITY AND IDEOLOGY

We have noted that this kind of moral education had been embraced by our ancestors in the past, and that feudalism and monarchism had used it extensively for their causes. As was noted above, the method and theory were developed by the Confucians after Confucius. Though historically there may have been reason for such an ideology, it contributed to the collapse of China in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Thus this part intends to clarify the difference between morality and ideology, and to trace the process of the transformation of morality into ideology. This process is too complicated to handle in a few pages for it involves, not only the purpose and method of morality but the psychological attitude of acceptance or resistance, free or coerced decisions, etc. Mass media, social circumstances, religion, etc., also play an important role in the process of transformation of morality into ideology. Aware of such complexity, we shall limit ourselves to a few points relevant to our discussion: (1) the meaning of ideology, (2) the nature of ideology, and finally (3) the process of the transformation of morality into ideology.

### *The Meaning of Ideology*

Historically, the term 'ideology' is very ambiguous, if not self-contradictory.[45] It means not simply 'a study of ideas' as the term suggests, but a system of correct ideas, which can determine others. However, as it is extremely difficult to know which idea is correct, we will take the common use of ideology as the standard of our discussion.

What we understand by ideology is of rather recent history. It was used by Karl Marx in his *Deutsche Ideologie*[46] and more recently by Karl Mannheim in his *Ideologie und Utopie*.[47] Marx understood ideology as a system of ideas, which, though logically valid, is constructed on an erroneous basis[48]—for example, the Platonic ideas, the Christian God, or the bourgeois constitution—the purpose of which is to defend the interests of the dominant class. Ironically, his view on ideology was reversed by such followers as Lenin, Stalin and Mao Tse-dung, so that the Soviet ideology[49] and the Maoist ideology were by no means compatible with the view of Marx. In a manner similar to the bourgeois whom they attack, with Marxist language they built another ideology to defend their own interests or those of the party. Thus, while Marx regards

ideology as a closed, self-proclaimed sufficient system of thought, which excludes freedom and tends toward determinism, his believers dogmatize Marxism as the most scientific, authoritative, rational and perfect system of ideas mankind could conceive. In a word, they regard Marxism as an ideology and reject all other thought.

This contradiction in fact lies in the nature of ideology itself, and can best be seen in the history of its development. According to Francis Bacon, de Tracy and de Condillac or Cabanis, ideology means a critique of false idols or idolatry.[50] It is a rational theory of knowledge constructed on empirical observation (Bacon),[51] sensation (de Condillac),[52] physical sensibility (Cabanis),[53] biological factors (de Tracy),[54] pleasure (Helvetius),[55] etc. It accuses idealism, spiritualism and rationalism of being irrational and unreal because constructed on a wrong basis.

These critiques were important to Marx for whom any theory, however logical, constructed on an erroneous basis is an ideology and falls prey to dogmatism. In this sense, he is against Bacon, de Condillac and Cabanis because their theories give birth to positivism, which is another form of ideology. In short, Marx stands completely and unconditionally against any form of ideology. Without doubt, the insights of Marx have a certain value in contributing to our understanding of ideology of today. His view that one must reject any theory which contradicts social human nature as a dynamic, evolutionary entity, which defends the *status quo* of social structures, or which makes eternal and absolute pronouncements, is extremely important for understanding moral education.

In this context, we regard as ideologies any closed theories (or *ism*) such as idealism, positivism, scientism, spiritualism or materialism. However, Marx's radical critique is not completely justified. His neglect of the positive aspect of ideology and his irresponsible attack on all forms of ideology gave birth either to anarchism or to another ideology such as that of the Soviet's and of Mao. For this reason, it would be better to look at ideology from two different angles: positive and negative, as did Mannheim.

Positive ideology is a systematic and scientific theory which satisfies a temporal need of society, which can resolve democratically and rationally conflicts of interest, and which is open to the future (in the trial and error manner advocated by Karl Popper).[56] Negative ideology is a logical system of ideas which can satisfy or resolve only certain problems and conflicts, but claims to be unique, eternal, unchangeable, omnipotent and free from any possible error. It is constructed, not on a scientific basis, but upon authority (whether

political, theological, economic or the like). It is arbitrary in the sense of serving the interests of a certain class or regime, though claiming to be universal. Its *raison d'etre* is nothing but the sheer means-ends rationality of instrumental reason.

Marx's critique of ideology is valid for this second kind of ideology, but remains insufficient because he failed to detect the positive aspect of ideology. Though temporal and insufficient, this can contribute to human progress by serving as a strong basis of culture, contributing to the formation of national consciousness, and playing a decisive factor in the development of the individual.

In *Ideology and Utopia*, Mannheim partly abandoned the Marxist material and class approach in understanding ideology. He understood ideology in the context of total social structure and tried to study both its positive and negative aspects. The undeniable value of ideology in shaping history and motivating economic development has been pointed out by Max Weber. The function of political and sociological ideology in developing and forming national or group identity or class consciousness has been made evident by Lukac's in *Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein*. Thus, Mannheim distinguishes between particular and total ideologies.

- Particular ideologies aim at refuting specific assertions "which may be regarded as concealments, falsifications or lies without attacking the integrity of the total mental structure of the asserting subject."[57]

- Total ideologies refer to the entire *Weltanschauung* of an age or historical group.[58] This kind of ideology is attacked by Marx, Nietzsche and Freud. Nietzsche devalues all traditional values which he regards as useless, unreal, inhuman. Marx rejects all concepts of justice, equality, fraternity, charity, as well as religions, as sheer forms of class interests. Freud casts doubt upon the whole history of human nature.

In viewing the complexity of ideology, Mannheim distinguishes between ideologies as idea-systems which are congruent with, and supportive of, the *status quo*, and those which are against this (as seen in Marx, Nietzsche and Freud). These two different and opposed senses are related and sometimes confused as two aspects of the same reality inasmuch as they have the same rigid totalitarian nature and give birth to a new kind of ideology once attacked. Utopias such as Marxism, Freudianism, or Nietzscheanism, which are opposed to the *status quo* and supportive of an alternative social

order or human nature, could have both of these characteristics. First, they are against the *status quo* of other ideologies; then they transform themselves into other ideologies or utopias. Thus, utopia has a double meaning: devaluation and revaluation, deconstruction and reconstruction.

*The Nature of Ideology*

In a previous article dealing with ideology,[59] I have tried to trace the line between ideologies by pinpointing some criteria. Those used were rather Kantian, being developed according to mathematical principles of universality and necessity. Since then the study of Wilhelm Dilthey and Habermas has shown that there is no absolute universality and necessity in morality as Kant had insisted, and that the human sciences differ in nature from the pure sciences.[60] It seems mistaken to interpret the nature of morality and ideology in terms of a mathematical model.

The quasi-transcendental categories proposed by Habermas should be considered as candidates for the needed criteria. I shall not discuss the scientific status of Habermas's quasi-transcendental categories; his categories do not claim an absolute scientific status, but are constructed after the model of language and the genetic psychology of Jean Piaget. Hence, his categories are at least more human and social than those of Kant or Aristotle. Though possibly insufficient, they avoid a dogmatic objectivism or relativism. Through a careful study of various schools of *Lebensphilosophie*, Habermas' theory escapes the naive belief of the Enlightenment in the absolute value of the sciences, and in its attempt to reduce all human activities to a scientific exploration.

Thus, we shall study the nature of ideology under the following aspects:

- its universal character in the sense of democratic decision-making and common sense
- its necessity
- its degree of freedom in decision-making
- its historicity
- its developing or dialectical essence
- its temporality and spatiality. A theory falls prey to ideology when it lacks a universal (that is, democratic) and necessary character, or when it is valid only for a certain place and time but claims an absolute and eternal character, forcing others to follow it

by any available means such as power, authority, manipulation or seduction. If these criteria are acceptable, then we can describe the nature of ideology as:

- lack of a universal and necessary character
- lack of free decision (relying on authority, power, wealth)
- of limited validity temporally and spatially
- tending to absolutize history, and thus being against historicity
- static, conservative and tending to defend the *status quo*
- conservative in method, stressing analysis and interpretation
- employing especially narrative and interpretative methods.

In view of this revised meaning and nature of ideology, we can now return to moral education: (a) to examine whether or not it is a kind of ideology, and (b) to inquire about its relevance and importance. On the first question, there is no doubt that moral education as practiced, e.g., in the 70s in Taiwan as reflected in the school text above, was a kind of ideology. That fact is acknowledged officially and accords with our criteria:

- it is effective for only a certain age in a certain time and at a certain place;
- it loses its weight when students become more critical and when they begin to wonder about freedom, autonomy and individual interests;
- it tends to defend the old social order or *status quo*;
- it uses a rigid, static, uncritical method;
- its topics reflect, not common interests, but only those of the State.

Before answering the second question, we need to examine the process of transformation of morality into ideology so that we can talk about the relevance and importance of ideology.

*The Transformation of Morality into Ideology*

To understand why morality becomes ideology one needs to know: the nature and effectiveness of morality, its political function in Chinese history and the process of its transformation into ideology.

*The nature and effectiveness of morality*

Since Aristotle, Western morality has been a study of human

conduct aiming at happiness, resolving conflicts and the like. On the nature of morality, however, there is a division: idealists and rationalists hold an eternal or transcendental nature for morality, while the empiricists and utilitarians think of moral nature in *a posteriori* terms, denying any transcendence to morality. The former tend to absolutize morality, while the latter tend to instrumentalize it.

In China, it is not the same. No school, including that of Confucius himself, regards morality either as transcendental and fully *a priori*, or as completely *a posteriori*. All schools, however, accepted the importance of morality and consider it the foundation of Chinese culture. This view could easily be misinterpreted or absolutized, as in the case of the Confucians after Confucius, to whom morality is the quintessence of Chinese culture and determines Chinese politics, aesthetics and economics. Morality is the last resort and highest point—higher even than religion.

It is this that gives birth to Confucian ideology when, by a *stroke*, morality is transformed into a kind of eternal and static instrument for the defense of the *status quo*. They ignore the fact that morality is of three different levels: the first or quasi transcendental is constructed on a human nature which also is transcendental; the second changes and develops in accordance with human evolution and development; and the third is built on social activity. With the exception of the first category, morality is seen as being in steady change. Of course, its development or change is in conformity with human development, with one's adaptation to nature and with one's capacity to resolve conflicts.

We will return to this problem in the third part when we discuss the theories of Habermas and Piaget on morality. Here we need only know how morality becomes ideology. We have stated that any attempt at transforming morality into ideology is tantamount to the act of dogmatizing, monopolizing and manipulating human beings for a calculated purpose. Thus, the transformation of morality into ideology begins with the first step of absolutizing and monopolizing morality.

In an agricultural society such as China at the time of Confucius, one tends to conquer nature, not by force, but by technical knowledge. One tends to defend oneself, not by violence, but by laws. That explains the effectiveness of morality, for it is the best means to domesticate barbarism and to survive in a crowded conflicting situation. It replaces the role of violence in the Stone Age, transforming it into a civilized society. Thus, as the best means

of educating men Confucius himself chose *li*[61] or rites as the symbol of morality, and music[62] as the symbol of civilization. The ineffectiveness of violence in an agricultural society in dealing with daily problems (of course, war is an exception) forced our ancestors to look for another more effective means for resolving conflicts without sacrificing one of the partners involved in the conflict. While violence always ends with one losing and one gaining, or with both losing, morality ends with the happy result of no one losing. The effectiveness of morality in society is undeniable; indeed it is so effective that one tends to absolutize it as the ultimate means and end.

### *The Political Function of Morality in China and Its Transformation into Ideology*

By regarding morality as the ultimate foundation, all human activities come to be built upon moral principles. Thus, politics is influenced by morality; indeed, the political order is constructed on the moral order, and the legitimacy of political order must be justified in terms of the moral leadership of the ruler.[63] In this context, morality becomes absolute. As pointed out, there are three different categories of morality: 1) the quasi-transcendental one born in man's most fundamental nature and in religion; 2) the second one based on human nature as changing and developing (in terms of the human genetic and psychological development proposed by Piaget and Kohlberg); and 3) the third which is formed and developed in the context of social activity. By absolutizing morality without discussing its nature, it is dogmatized and transformed into ideology.

The process of transformation of morality into ideology is legitimated and justified: 1) by accepting its effectiveness, 2) by applying it in society (politics), and finally 3) by interpreting it in accordance with the interests of the ruling class. It is the third point which distinguishes morality from ideology. We acknowledge that morality of the first category is transcendental or quasi-transcendental. This means morality has a common nature accepted by mankind and is not restricted by space or time. A Chinese has much the same duty toward his parents as a European or African. Morality in the second category is of only limited transcendence. It is developing and changing, and cannot be held as universal. For example, sexual morality is varied in each country, and for different groups or classes. The third category of morality changes according to the social development so that these moral laws are often identified

with social laws.

The process of transforming morality into ideology, takes the third category to be the first, while ignoring the nature of the second category. Thus, one interprets national, civil, royal or party laws to be universal morality, and civil duties to be categorical imperatives. This violent and radical interpretation was practiced in the era after Confucius. All social laws such as loyalty, obedience, respect, and humility came to be interpreted as the most universal laws. Once forcefully accepted, these virtues become the cornerstone of Chinese political and economic activities. A dynasty is built on loyalty and obedience. Corporations are based on *yi* and confidence, family structure is built on filial piety rather than on love. This is contrary to Confucius' preaching of *jen* or benevolence, of love and harmony. This explains also the practices in the past of excluding women in society, dividing classes, and excluding all but the *Shi* or ruling class from policy and decision-making. The violent interpretation of the third category of morality explains why there is such a difference between the politics of Yao, Schwen, Chou and others. Yao or Schwen based their politics on the first category of morality, while the others based theirs on the third category but interpreted it as the first category. While the politics of Yao and Schwen were democratic, the latter is dogmatic and dictatorial.

## MORALITY AND INTERESTS: A CRITIQUE OF IDEOLOGY

By analyzing our present moral education in the first part, and making a distinction between morality and ideology in the second part, we come to a tentative proposal that a sound moral education must be freed of the characteristics of ideology. At first glance this seems a quasi-impossible task, for it involves not only national policy, but also the method of teaching and learning. We lack also the critique necessary for distinguishing ideology from morality, and thus far we have no theory which can determine the exact nature of morality. Thus, in this part, we shall focus upon the last point, i.e., the nature of morality, as the first step toward a sound understanding of moral education.

The second part mentioned briefly the nature of morality, but too briefly for an adequate understanding. Morality was divided into three different categories: quasi-transcendental, empirical and social morality. This division was already visible in Aristotle who acknowledged that morality, though born in human nature (*ethos*),

was developed in human social relations and human activity (*ethicos*).[64] He acknowledged also that morality attempts to transcend the limit of time and space, but contradicted himself by interpreting morality in terms of customs and habits which are time and space-bound. In this way, he confused the three categories of morality. The same mistake is found in the Latin tradition with its understanding of morality as *morals*, which comes rather from the term *mos*, i.e., customs or habits.[65] As habits, morality loses its claim to dictate or transform human nature. It lacks transcendence (universality and necessity) and becomes class morality or the morality of a certain social group. Kant refused to accept such an understanding of morality, and his distinction between *morals* and morality is genial.[66] But his radical insistence on the neutrality, objectivity and transcendence of morality makes his morality 'inhuman' and asocial. Designed for a superman, it seems beyond space and time and incompatible with human beings. Hegel correctly criticized Kantian morality as aloof,[67] as not morality but only the idea of morality. His solution of identifying morality and morals seems headed along the right path, and able to resolve the dichotomy between Kant's transcendental morality and Locke's empirical morality. Regretfully, he failed because his solution engaged only his mind and reality.

In our view, morality must be understood in the same way as human nature which tends toward its perfection (in relative terms). Hence, what Aristotle and other moralists call *morals* in the sense of *mos* are in fact only some apparent, changing and accidental forms of morality, but are not yet morality. The same applies to the social order and social laws: customs, morals, laws and orders are limited in time and space and express only a part of the totality of human nature. They are not yet morality, which expresses what is most fundamental to human nature such as the act of preserving oneself, the act of loving and the need for communication.[68] It expresses the duration of human nature through time and universal space. To be more concrete, the act of killing is against such properties of human nature as preserving, loving and communicating, and is eternally condemned by all societies in every place.

However, this distinction does not help us to locate or to build sound moral education. As described above, a pure morality, although both neutral and universal, could degenerate or be manipulated in practice. For this reason all three aspects of morality must be studied seriously. In fact, a pure morality is impossible in practice, while a purely empirical morality will generate disorientation and relativism

in moral education. Therefore, sound moral education should be based on a genuine, rational, democratic and practical consensus of basic human interests and nature.

Such a consensus must satisfy the rigorous tests of the human sciences and the demand of reason. It is universal on two different levels: *a priori*, for it is inborn and inseparable from one's most basic human nature; *a posteriori* but nonetheless 'transcendental', for it is born and developed in accord with human activities, but has a certain dimension of universality and necessity such as language and communicative acts. For Habermas the second kind of universal principle is quasi-transcendental. To accept only the first kind is to fall into the metaphysical domain, while to affirm only the second one is to be limited to the range of empiricism. In contrast to separating the three different natures of morality, these two kinds of universals must be seen as interwoven.

Habermas' consensus is precisely a tentative synthesis of these two kinds of universals, for consensus is:

- the most essential characteristic of the human race;
- the main reason explaining the formation of society;
- quasi transcendental in the sense that other quasi transcendental forms such as language, feeling, hope, etc., are explicit forms of consensus;
- expressive of human freedom by resisting any dogmatic coercion;
- the symbol of the human capacity for communication; and
- expressed by such forms of communication as grammar, laws, morals and customs.

The question, however, is how to achieve this consensus. It is the main question treated by Habermas in his three important works, namely, *Knowledge and Human Interests*,[69] *Towards a Reconstruction of Historical Materialism*,[70] and *Theory of Communicative Action*.[71] What are their implications for moral education? First, in order to discover a genuine consensus, one needs to criticize all that blocks this consensus. Thus, according to Habermas, a critique of ideology is the *conditio sine qua non* for attaining consensus.[72]

Our critique of the present moral education as a form of ideology—i.e., a system grounded on a belief which maintains its legitimacy despite its inability to be validated in rational discourse—is intended as the first step toward a genuine consensus in our moral

education. Our critique questions the emphasis or overemphasis upon the instrumentality of moral education, the development of method or technical abilities at the cost of its content, and the disarray in applying moral education which produces both a loss of moral meaning in day-to-day life and a diminution of freedom of choice. The critique is not against science as such, but questions any form of domination which distorts or deforms consensus, and any form of manipulation by a certain class, regime or dynasty for the purpose of dictating the moral codes in favor of their own interests.

But critique is only the first step of a project aimed at discovering the heart of moral education and engaging therein. In this part we need to proceed constructively in pointing out the basis of consensus and shall follow Habermas' analysis of interests because it can illumine the nature of consensus. According to Habermas, in order to reconstruct an authentic moral education, one needs:

- to pinpoint the most basic human interests which determine our conduct,
- to reconstruct moral regulations based on these basic interests, and
- to test moral regulations in daily life in order to verify these regulations in accordance with human consensus.

*Interests and Morality*

In the second part, we tried to distinguish between ideology and morality and indicated that most of the so-called codes in our moral system bear ideological characteristics. Similarly, we shall try now to show the difference between substantial or basic interests and secondary interests. Basic interests are:

- universal or common to mankind. They are also necessary in the sense that they are an inseparable part of human nature.
- necessary conditions for human life and for society. According to Marx, basic human interests are material or economic and on these human conduct is constructed. This is not wrong but insufficient, for material interests alone cannot satisfy human needs or explain the whole complex of human and social structures, such as those of the family. The material interests cannot produce arts or generate purely intellectual needs. Finally, we cannot logically and scientifically demonstrate the relationship between material

interests and those of emancipation, freedom, progress, etc. Thus, we need to consider a third type of interests, namely those,

- transcendent in character, that is, they have an indefinite and unlimited capacity for progress, development and openness towards new horizons. In this sense, all that Habermas expresses as 'emancipation',[73] Adorno calls 'negativity',[74] Bloch defines as 'hope',[75] and even Popper signifies by 'openness'[76]—all express these basic interests of transcendence.

Other interests which cannot satisfy these three conditions are secondary or auxiliary, limited, particular and accidental. They produce only limited effects, and bear little weight upon human conduct.

With these criteria in mind, in examining the nature and conditions of moral regulations one must distinguish substantial moral codes built upon basic interests from accidental codes built upon auxiliary interests. To distinguish the two types of interests requires a profound understanding of the nature of human interests themselves and their relation to human nature. Here the first obstacle is that we cannot grasp the whole of human nature, but only a part: human nature is as mysterious as is the divine. What we can grasp is that human nature is still developing and to be revealed (in Heidegger's expression) through our actions and relations with others and with ourselves. Hence, what we describe here is of only relative value. Though insufficient, we can hope for some light upon moral education from Habermas's description of human interests.

*Human Interests and Human Nature*

In his well-known book, *Knowledge and Human Interests*, Habermas proposed approaching three aspects of human interests by three different methods. As it is not our intention to undertake the project of establishing an epistemology based upon interests, we will put aside his work on method and epistemology. Our attention is directed rather to the nature of these interests and whether or not they are of universal, necessary and transcendent character.

Habermas divided human interests into three different categories: technical, practical and emancipatory:

- *Technical interests* are understood as "anthropologically deep-seated interests" in predicting and controlling events in the natural environment.[77] They are born in the human desire to respond

to the material needs to survive and to satisfy basic instincts; in short, they are the interests of domination.

- *Practical interests* are rooted in human social nature and respond to the need to secure and expand the possibilities of mutual and self-understanding in the conduct of life.[78]

- *Emancipatory interests* aim at liberation from pseudo-natural constraints whose power resides in their non-transparency.[79] In Freudian expression, emancipatory interests express the human desire for freedom and authenticity.

According to Habermas, these interests satisfy both theory and practice. As theory or contemplation of the cosmos they share with the sciences a commitment to the "theoretical attitude that frees those who take it from dogmatic association with the natural interests of life and their irritating influence."[80] They aim also at "describing the universe theoretically in its law-like order, just as it is." As practice, they describe and guide the life-world. They are not influences on cognition that have to be eliminated for the sake of the objectivity of knowledge; rather they themselves determine the aspect under which reality can be objectified and thus made accessible to experience in the first place. They are for all subjects capable of speech and action the necessary conditions for the possibility of experience that claims to be objective.[81] Accordingly, the interests constitutive of knowledge are linked to the functions of an ego that adapts itself to its external conditions through learning processes, is initiated into the communications system of a social life-world by means of self-formative processes, and constructs an identity in the conflict between instinctual aims and social constraints.[82]

A quick glance at these interests indicates that all these interests could claim a certain universal necessity. They are reconstructed after such evident human characteristics as instincts and language, which we consider as quasi transcendental. Habermas's 'transcendental' is not identified completely with that of Kant: whereas the 'transcendentals' in Kant's system are universal and necessary in the sense of being beyond space and time, the 'quasi transcendentals' of Habermas are subject to change in accordance with the nature of language and human instincts. They relate first to the universal process of preserving, conserving and developing, that is, to the dialectical nature of mankind. In short, the difference between Kant and Habermas lies in the fact that Habermas's analysis of interests is based on human nature as such, while Kant relies only on the faculty of knowledge. This means that

Kant had seen only a kind of human interest, namely, technical interests in their theoretical form.

Before examining Habermas's claim that interests are the basis of human nature, we need to understand what he means by human nature. It is true that Habermas, like Marx and the members of The Frankfurt School, protests any theory of human nature based upon static, idealist and metaphysical foundations. He rejects the Platonic Idea, the solipsist Cartesian *Cogito*, and the Kantian transcendental Ego as the basis for human nature, and accepts the Marxian idea that human nature is constructed upon human praxis. However, he considers the Marxian understanding of praxis as labor to be too simplistic. As a productive action labor can explain only human technical interests, [83] not why we have or need morality. Nor does it satisfy the human desire of freedom.

We will not discuss here whether Habermas's critique of Marx's praxis is justified. What attracts our interest is Habermas's position that human nature is interrelated with human activities or praxis taken in a much broader sense than that of Marx, for it explains the total activity in a total structure of practical, contemplative, technical, emancipatory and communicative activity.[84] In a word, human nature is so complex and total that one cannot grasp it by means of a concept or a certain activity. It develops dynamically in the Hegelian manner of describing the activity of spirit. The human interests Habermas tentatively described are among the most explicit 'presentations' of human nature. To say that they are universal and necessary means only that they belong to human nature which is universal.

*A Critique of Interests*

To see whether fundamental human interests can be served by moral education, one must examine whether or not these interests are as real and complete as Habermas claimed and, secondly, in the case of interest-conflicts, what criteria are needed for their resolution.

First, Habermas analyzed technical interests from the point of view of domination. Technical interests are meant to expand knowledge which is the best tool for controlling nature and others in order to secure the position of mankind and free it from danger. Expanding technology and knowledge, developing medical practice and pharmaceuticals, aims at prolonging human life and rendering it more agreeable. At the same time, for such a purpose one needs to

dominate all other factors which might endanger man. A contradiction appears in technical interests, namely, between the two elements of destruction and construction, conservation and development, which are hidden in these interests. Domination means destroying nature for the sake of preserving man; expanding knowledge and technique means pursuing development in order to secure the position of man. This contradiction in the very essence of technical interests shows that any solution of interests is impossible. Thus, Marx for example, had followed the Darwinian description of struggle for life by accepting the class-struggle solution. If this is so, then conflict is as fundamental as technical interests, and any attempt to subdue it is futile.

Second, practical interests themselves are ambiguous, just as technical interests are also practical. Obviously, Habermas has taken the Kantian description of practical sciences in order to explain practical interests. Since in Kant's moral philosophy praxis is almost identified with moral activity, according to Habermas practical interests are aimed at the modes of the human conduct of life. Their purpose is to help human beings regulate human conflicts without being exploited or manipulated. In another expression, if Aristotle understands morality as a way of achieving happiness, then Habermas describes human practical interests as those which aim at resolving conflicts and at regulating human conduct. This explication is sound but incomplete, for if practical interests are limited to those functions then morality is deformed into a kind of law or social convention and loses its own sublime end, i.e., the meaning of life. His morality is as such purely materialist[85] and temporal, for since conflicts are as essential as interests, they will never have a definitive solution. Thus, all moral acts are only strategic and for a certain purpose. Morality is degraded into instrumentality, which Habermas himself had vehemently attacked.

Third, there is hardly any difference between practical and emancipatory interests, because the latter express the same idea of freeing and resolving conflicts described in the former, though in a different milieu. Emancipatory interests arise only by means of reflecting on the conditions of human life, comparing them with those of others, reflecting on human nature and finally criticizing those conditions. This description of emancipatory interests cannot satisfy the question of why we need or have such interests, whether or not one can find the meaning of life, the ultimate concern of man, etc.

Evidently, Habermas's interests lack the most fundamental reason urging man to develop technical knowledge, to further

morality and to retain ultimate hope. We call it the interest in transcendence, by which we mean the human desire and capacity to overcome the conflicts of interest, to find the meaning of one's life and world and to tend toward the ultimate concern. Such transcendent interests are visible in Confucius' concept of harmony and *jen*, which we will discuss later.

Further, the inner contradiction in Habermas' theory of interests, namely, that among the interests themselves, seems impossible to overcome. It is difficult to accept that human nature is tending simultaneously toward domination and consensus. To accept domination as essential to human nature, one must think of consensus as a merely temporal strategy the purpose of which is to avoid defeat in case of weakness. The logical consequence of Habermas's insistence upon domination in his interpretation of human interest would reduce everything to an endless struggle between man and nature as well as among human beings themselves—thus his theory of consensus as the foundation of morality would collapse.

*Communicative Action*

The weakness of the theory of human interests forces Habermas to develop a new theory: the theory of communicative action,[86] to supplement his theory of human interests. Basically, the idea of consensus remains as the backbone, but in a certain aspect this theory is more sophisticated than the prior one, for it attempts to resolve the contradiction between various interests by proposing quasi-transcendental elements to justify consensus. The element of domination is downgraded, while that of harmony in the form of consensus in language, laws or habits is upgraded.[87] Practical interests are now interpreted in the sense of the interests in communication, in understanding and in finding a consensual solution acceptable to all partners.

Weber's theory of rationalization, which Habermas used to demonstrate his thesis of technical interests, is reinterpreted in the light of Gadamer's hermeneutics to base a new process of understanding and its categories upon such common human features as language.[88] Here, it is shown that the need for communication and consensus in human nature is as real and necessary as other interests. Further, as his communicative action is not *a priori*, but empirically constructed and reconstructed, human acts are seen as tending naturally toward communication and man as tending naturally and necessarily to solve conflicts of interests, for communication is

impossible without resolving conflicts by means of consensus. Habermas cites concrete examples in language, psychoanalysis and politics to demonstrate his theory of communicative action. For example, language is our common tool, but by learning a language we accept the rules implicit in it. Thus, the first step in understanding others is accepting the common rule of others. However, the act of learning shows also the active participation of the subject in this common rule, for the rule of language is by no means eternal but needs to be changed or improved if it cannot satisfy human communication, or causes misunderstanding or conflicts. Here, communication appears as the transcendental basis for consensus and language. But if this is so then one has arrived at the metaphysical explanation that communication is an *a priori* in human nature, and that miscommunication is only a form of distorted communication. Such a metaphysical or theological explanation is rejected by Habermas as well as by empiricists and positivists. (Note that such arguments on the nature of communication or miscommunication are analogous to the dispute between Hsun Tzu and Mencius on the nature of man.) Such arguments do not make sense because Habermas never intends to demonstrate the *a priori* character of communication or language. To him, the transcendental character of language does not show us that language is *a priori* or *a posteriori*, but only its universality and necessity. The model of language is used only to show that communication, like language, possesses this transcendental character.[89]

Although this theory of communication is an improvement over his earlier theory of human interests, it is not free of problems. Since our aim is not to center upon Habermas's theory, but to use it in order to shed more light upon the nature of moral education, we will not discuss his theory further, nor its problems. Only one point relating to our moral education needs to be mentioned, namely, Habermas's unanswered question: why do we need communication? If communication is a transcendental then so are conflicts of the same nature; if communication is needed only as a means to resolve conflicts in human interests, then interests are the main theme to be discussed, but he has insufficiently developed and resolved that theme.

## MORALITY AND RESPONSI BILITY

The difficulty in Habermas' theory of human interests means that one cannot build morality or moral education on interests alone.

Regulations built upon a division of interests practiced by bourgeois society, even if this division is agreed to by all members or parties, are not necessarily right and just because: 1) there is no common basis for this division—the regulations are often dictated by a certain party; 2) these regulations are thus only temporary; and 3) these regulations are not free from coercion or manipulation. The model of language given by Habermas based upon the consent of all parties is inapplicable in the domain of economy. In short, the transcendental status of morality that Habermas sought in human interests is not as easily found as he claimed.

*Responsibility*

Lawrence Kohlberg developed an understanding of morality from another point of view, similar to Jean Piaget's theory of cognitive development.[90] In his *The Psychology of Moral Development,* [91] he followed the division of epistemological development into various stages proposed by Piaget, and identified three stages in the development of moral consciousness: 1) a pre-conventional stage which orients to actions, 2) a conventional stage which explains how man is aware of norms and anti-norms, and 3) a post conventional stage in which one treats only norms as such.[92] Kohlberg's division is a great advantage in understanding the nature of the second category of morality, i.e., its quasi-transcendental character as following human nature itself.

Nonetheless, his analysis in accordance with Piaget's description of the stages of cognitive development is still questionable. First, one would need to verify the plausibility of Piaget's cognitive development theory, and second, one would need to check the analogy between cognitive development and psychological development and between psychological development and moral development. (We will not criticize Kohlberg's theory in terms of his intention to develop only moral judgment and not morality as such in this article, because it is not fully necessary for our discussion.) To evaluate whether the theory of Piaget is acceptable, one needs to consider some of his main theses. According to Piaget, our knowledge develops genetically in two different senses: one narrower and the other wider. First, Piaget distinguishes among stages of cognitive development characterized in terms of structurally described levels of learning ability. In the narrower sense, cognitive development refers to the structures of thought and action acquired constructively by the growing child in active confrontation with

external reality or the processes of the objective world.[93] That means that children develop their intelligence through their reciprocal action between themselves as subjects and other physical and social objects, between themselves as subjects and other subjects. Second, cognitive development in a wider sense signifies the de-centering of an egocentric understanding of the world. This means that cognitive development is understood as the construction not solely of an external world, but also of a reference system for the simultaneous demarcation of the objective and social worlds from the subject world.[94]

This theory of cognitive development is plausible as far as it goes. However, whether this theory could be applied in the normative world remains questionable. The fact is that cognitive development is not identified with moral development. In Kohlberg's interpretation, cognitive development is parallel to the development of our moral judgment. But this interpretation cannot be sustained because moral knowledge does not equate to moral action, although the former is necessary to value a moral act. Besides, the domain of human psychology is not as scientific as that of knowledge. Cognitive development increases with the tempo of the reception of knowledge from outside and from reflection, while psychological development accords generally with genetic development. The difference between psychology and epistemology, between epistemology and morality (as Kant had been aware) renders the thesis of Kohlberg questionable. Habermas supplements the idea of Piaget[95] and Kohlberg[96] in the following chart,[97] according to which the future or post-conventional morality is based on principles accepted by individuals (responsibility) and is rather formal and democratic.

**STAGES OF DEVELOPMENT**

| *Stages of Moral Consciousnes* | *Fundamental Socio-Cognitive Concept* | *Ethics* | *Types of Laws* |
|---|---|---|---|
| Pre-conventional | Particular expectation regarding conduct | Magical ethics | Revealed law |
| Conventional | Norms | Legal ethics | Traditional law |
| Post-conventional | Principles | Ethics of responsibility | Formal law |

## A CONFUCIAN CONCEPT OF MORAL EDUCATION

This idea of Habermas is of great significance for moral education. How we educate the students to be responsible, to respect laws and build consensus, is discussed further in my work on Habermas's consensus and Confucian harmony.[98] In the frame of this article, I would raise some reflections on the Confucian (and not Confucianist) idea of moral education. Confucius' description of the process of moral development in The Great Learning is very impressive; he begins with the individual as such, with the way an individual acquires a moral sense and rectifies him/herself.[99] The crucial difficulty in understanding his idea concerns the criteria of morality which the individual should follow and how the individual knows them. As his explanation does not seem to be clear, it appears to suggest the other 'extreme', namely, that the social factor determines the individual:

There are four things in the Way of the superior man (chun-tzu), none of which I have been able to do. To serve my father as I would expect my son to serve me: that I have been unable to do. To serve my ruler as I would expect my ministers to serve me: that I have not been able to do. To serve my elder brothers as I would expect my younger brothers to serve me: that I have not been able

to do. To be the first to treat friends as I would expect my friends to treat me: that I have not been able to do.[100]

> The ancients who wished to manifest their clear character to the world would first bring order to their states. Those who wished to bring order to their states, would first regulate their families. Those who wished to regulate their families would first cultivate their personal lives. Those who wished to cultivate their personal lives would first rectify their mind.[101]

These ambiguous statements encouraged his followers to treat the individual as secondary because all norms are social, that is, of state or family. On the other hand, Confucius himself seems to incline to the theory that moral feelings are personal and a matter of self-consciousness. Many passages confirm such an understanding, for example: "Heaven produced the virtue that is in me,"[102] or "Confucius said, 'Man is born with uprightness. If one loses it, he will be lucky if he escapes with his life'."[103] These ambiguities in the way Confucius handled the nature of morality led to the Confucian ideology which affirms the role of the State in deciding and judging moral acts, and in making laws.

A third way of interpreting Confucius' explanation of human nature as moral nature should be studied to counter this tendency to make Confucian theories dogmatic. That is, Confucius might have understood that human nature and moral nature are apprehended and accepted by man through learning, which means acquiring knowledge of good or evil through actions, contacts with others and living in nature and in society. Confucius for example said:

> At fifteen my mind was set on learning. At thirty my character had been formed. At forty I had no more perplexities. At fifty I knew the Mandate of Heaven (*T'ien-ming*). At sixty I was at ease with whatever I heard. At seventy I could follow my heart's desire without transgressing moral principles.[104]

The above passage and many similar ones point to a series of stages:

*First stage*:

- The learning process is one of mutual-cognition and recognition of the subject and other objects and subjects.
- The learning process and cognitive reception are developed through individual as well as social praxis.

*Second stage*:

- Moral cognition or consciousness is acquired through learning fundamental human interests based upon human nature and their impact upon subjective life.
- Moral judgment is based on the benefits of a division of interests and on the natural order.

*Third stage*:

- Moral laws are constructed on moral judgment and the consensus of basic interests.
- The act of consensus is free from coercion; it comes from the subjective cognition of moral laws or from self-consciousness.
- A metaphysical and theological foundation of morality is possible.

*The First Stage*

The dispute between Mencius and Hsun Tzu on the nature of human beings misreads the original Confucian idea on human nature. Human nature is originally neither good nor bad, but tends both to goodness and to evil, for the two are known to us when either could help or harm the subject, offering benefit or loss, pleasure or pain. That is to say, goodness is what fulfills and satisfies subjective interests or desires, and evil is the opposite. 'Tending towards' is by no means *a priori,* but rather 'transcendental', in the sense that the desire for goodness or evil emerges in human involvement or contact with nature and one's fellow human. Human acts could be good or bad depending on the milieu, the benefits, the degree of satisfaction of human interests or the universality of those interests. Thus, goodness or evil are learned through our experiences, education and tradition. Confucius, for example, said: "Give me a few more years so that I can devote fifty years to the study of change. I may be free from great mistakes."[105] Or "There are those who act without knowing (what is right). But I am not one of them. To hear much and select what is good and follow it, to see much and remember it, is the second type of knowledge (next to innate

knowledge)."[106]

Human action, living-experiences in the life-world help one to know goodness and evil. But in order to be conscious the human act must be neither purely objective nor purely subjective. The dualist interpretation of the Western tradition and the dualist attitude of Mencius and Hsun Tzu cannot but only help obscure human nature. The fundamental human act is natural and reversible or dialectical,[107] that is, it has the twin character of giving and receiving, of analyzing and synthesizing. It is a mutual cognitive act: "to serve my father as I would expect my son to serve me, to serve my ruler as I would my ministers to serve."[108]

Third, the learning process is developed through human practice. Confucius is very clear in this point when he asserts that rightness is acquired only through human acts depending upon the natural order. His argument against the Duke of She in *The Analects* is striking: The Duke of She told Confucius, "In my country there is an upright man named Kung. When his father stole a sheep, he bore witness against him." Confucius said, "The upright men in my community are different from this. The father conceals the misconduct of the son, and the son conceals the misconduct of the father. Uprightness is to be found in this."[109] Here, uprightness is known not by an external factor unrelated to human act such as neutral laws, but through the act of mutual loving between father and son.

*The Second Stage*

We have argued that morality is acquired through learning, and that learning is a mutual cognition and recognition of the benefit of interpersonal activity. However, the point to be raised here is that not all actions can produce knowledge, and not all knowledge could help us to have moral criteria. To solve this problem moral cognition should be viewed from the aspects of human interests. Habermas has analyzed three fundamental human interests determining human nature: technical, practical and emancipatory. Technical interests explain the most fundamental human instincts of survival by dominating, controlling, expanding, etc., but give birth to the inevitable conflicts of the social man. They are the interests of survival, but also of destruction.

Practical interests aim at solving these conflicts by moral and civil laws which are constructed on the consensus of men regarding their fundamental interests. Confucius had a similar idea, namely,

that the fundamental interests must be 'equally' and rightly distributed. Laws and morality, as the best means of warranting a right distribution of these fundamental interests, must reflect the consensus of interests. He said of the superior man: "The superior man is conciliatory but does not identify himself with others,"[110] and "If a ruler sets himself right, he will be followed without his command."[111] But the most convincing evidence in support of this interpretation is Confucius' theory of harmony. From the anthropological perspectives, harmony concerns human interests at various stages and is as natural as the cosmological or physical order. Each has its role and function; each receives what it needs according to its capacity (just as Marx later promised in his 1848 *Communist Manifesto*).[112] In the words of Confucius: "He who possesses great virtue will certainly attain to corresponding position and wealth, to corresponding fame, and to corresponding long life. For Heaven, in the production of things, is sure to be bountiful of them, according to their natural capacity."[113]

To be more clear, the Confucian theory of harmony could be understood from the following aspects: 1) harmony is a natural fact and appears in nature; 2) it is seen in the relation between man and nature; and 3) is found in human relationships. In the *Doctrine of the Mean*, there is an interesting passage: "What Heaven imparts to man is called human nature. To follow our nature is called the Way. Cultivating the Way is called education."[114] This sheds light upon the three points above.

*Harmony in Nature*

This harmony in the cosmological order is determined not by a human factor but by Heaven. Cosmological order is a perfect order and in Kantian terms is both *a priori* and transcendental. Whenever some mishaps occur, it is understood that man had done something wrong against Heaven: "When equilibrium and harmony are realized to the highest degree, Heaven and earth will attain their proper order and all things will flourish."[115]

*Harmony between Man and Nature*

For Confucius, as human nature is part of Heaven,[116] man originally possessed this harmonious status. The break or conflict between man and nature is due to the fact that man is thirsty for power and domination, for accumulation of interests. However, this

could be self-contradictory, for if man is harmonious in the cosmological order, how could he tend towards evil? Hsun Tzu may go too far in asserting that human nature is evil, but he provided some corrective to the overoptimistic Mencius. In fact, the human and social order are understood by Confucius analogously to the cosmological order so that what determines human fate is not the *a priori* cosmological order, but human actions such as interrelations, labor and the like, for this is Confucius' concern in establishing moral laws.

*Harmony among Humans Themselves*

This is the central theme of the Confucian harmony: to express no conflict (feelings) between men, to subdue conflicts[117] when they arise, and, more importantly, to have a just distribution of interests based on a natural equilibrium: Therefore the superior man governs men as men, in accordance with human nature, and as soon as they change (which is wrong) he stops. Consciousness (*chung*) and altruism (*shu*) are not far from the Way: what you do not wish others to do to you, do not do to them.[118]

*The Third Stage*

By accepting that morality was learned in nature and human society and that morality was constructed in accordance with natural laws, Confucius had tried to establish moral criteria based upon: 1) harmony between nature and man, and 2) harmony between men. We will concentrate on the second point, i.e., moral criteria constructed on human *sociality* or harmony between men.

In discussing Habermas's theory of consensus and in Part I analyzing present moral education, we insisted on the necessity of paying attention to the fundamental problem of conflict. We pinpointed human interests and conflicts at the base of any moral system. Thus, to solve moral conflicts means precisely to solve fundamental human conflicts of interests. One solution which appears plausible is Habermas's consensus. A similar solution was offered by Confucius regarding what criteria an individual needs in order to rectify himself. These criteria concern not an imaginary lone individual, but one's real experiences of living, interacting and working in a society. The criteria aim at solving conflicts and attaining harmony. In this context, Confucius constructed his moral criteria in three different fields: harmonious living, harmonious relationships,

and an harmonious way of nature.

*Moral Criteria of Harmonious Living*

Tung Chung-shu developed Confucius' concept *jen* (humanity) as follows:

> What is meant by humanity? The man of humanity loves people with a sense of commiseration. He is careful and agreeable and does not quarrel. His likes and dislikes are harmonized with human relations. He does not harbor the feeling of hate or a desire to hurt. He has no intention to conceal or to evade. He has no disposition of jealousy. He has no desires that lead to sadness or worry. He does not do anything treacherous or cunning. And he does not do anything depraved. Therefore his heart is at ease, his will is peaceful, his vital force is harmonious, his desires are regulated, his actions are easy, and his conduct is in accord with the moral law. It is for this reason that he puts things in order peacefully and easily without any quarrel. That is what is meant by humanity.[119]

In the *Analects*, Confucius demonstrated the following virtues (note that virtue comes from *virtus* in Latin meaning the characteristic nature of a man, *vir*):

- Filial piety (1:2)
- Brotherliness (1:2)
- Loyalty (1:4)
- Faithfulness (1:4)
- Sincerity (1:8, 1:16, etc.)
- Benevolence (4:3, 7:29, etc.)
- Dutifulness (5:25, etc.)
- Rites, properly conducts (li) (1:15, 2:3, etc.)

The above regulations or virtues aim at: 1) establishing a harmonious and orderly life agreed to by society and each individual, and 2) defending the interests of every individual and of society: "What you do not wish others to do to you, do not do to them."

*Criteria of Harmonious Relationship or the Doctrine of the Mean*

The philosophy of Confucius had a great role in shaping the politics and economics of Chinese society. Its criteria include loyalty, dutifulness, responsibility, righteousness, conscientiousness, altruism, unity of theory and practice,[120] and the observance of rites. Confucius stated:

> There are five universal ways (in human relations), and the ways by which they are practiced are three. The five are those governing the relationship between ruler and ministers, between father and son, between husband and wife, between elder and young brothers, and those in the intercourse between friends. These five are universal paths in the world. Wisdom, humanity and courage, these three are the universal virtues. The way by which they are practiced is one.[121]

In more detailed description he said:

> There are nine standards by which to administer the empire, its states and the families. They are: cultivating personal life, honoring the worthy, being affectionate to relatives, being respectful toward the great ministers, identifying oneself with the welfare of the whole body of officers, treating the common people as one's own children, attracting the various partisans, showing tenderness to strangers from far countries, and extending kindly and awesome influence on the feudal lords.[122]

*Criteria of Harmonious Way in Nature*

Though these criteria are not developed and often are vaguely stated, they are as important as those criteria in the first and second categories. Confucius begins *The Doctrine of the Mean* with: "What Heaven imparts to man is called human nature. To follow our nature is called the Way (*Tao*)—The Way cannot be separated from us a moment."[123] For Confucius, nature, man and Heaven are inseparable in the sense that they belong to the Wholeness determining the structure of the cosmos. What Confucius means by

Heaven is not our concern in this article,[124] but it is extremely important to note that the purely materialist outlook of humanism is against the theory of harmony. To understand the value of his insistence on harmony with Heaven, nature and man, one should keep in mind that the act of relationship is itself a dialectical act and that only by means of a hermeneutic circle can one understand the Confucian consensus.

Having reviewed the Confucian understanding of morality, we come now to the tentative conclusion that Confucius understood moral education as a continuous learning of human nature, and that moral rules are constructed not dogmatically, but by a certain consensus. This consensus is constructed on the natural order, on human relational activities and on fundamental human nature. In a word, the Confucian description of morality and consensus, though not as sophisticated and systematic as Habermas's and Kohlberg's, has given a deep insight into understanding the genetic formation and transformation of morality. Certainly, it sheds light upon present moral education.

## CONCLUSION

Our conclusion is rather tentative and inconclusive in the sense that it serves only as a critical reflection upon our present system of moral education. The task of critique is not to protest, but to detect the symptoms of illness. We have found the ideological elements in our moral education to be one of these symptoms. We do not deny that ideological education has its own value: it had helped to maintain the Chinese identity, to rally patriotism in time of war, to preserve Chinese culture, etc. Nor do we refuse to accept its necessity.

Our critique aims to show only that ideology is of value only for a certain time and place. It lacks the universal and necessary (or transcendental) character of an authentic morality built on the most fundamental human interests (and nature). Thus, its claim to solve all moral problems and to provide mankind with a future direction or sense of life is very questionable. This explains why 'moral education', although rigorously and officially promoted, falls short of its objectives. Our critique aims also at the instrumentality of "moral education." Mistakenly taken by Confucians as an instrument, morality was reduced to a functional purpose, a sheer instrument, which was easily manipulated and dictated by a certain regime or class. As such, it was transformed into an ideology.

For all these reasons, it is suggested that our policy and method of moral education, as well as its application, be rethought in a more open manner. Moral education aims at the broader objective of improving mankind as Confucius had proposed: "The Way of learning to be great consists in manifesting clear character, loving the people, and abiding in the highest good."[125]

## NOTES

[1] By Confucianism, we understand the theories or doctrines based on the teachings of Confucius, Mencius, etc., and systematically developed into the philosophical school named for Confucius. Many scholars have complained that a great number of Confucians have distorted the original teaching of Confucius. See, for example, the article of Roger Ames and David L. Hall, "Getting it Right, on Saving Confucius from the Confucians," *Philosophy East and West*, 34 (1984).

[2] The textbook is entitled *Citizen and Morality*. Officials identify citizen education with moral education. See *Gung-ming yu Tao-te* (Citizen and Morality), ed. National Compile Institute (Taipei, 1985), 6 vols. Hereafter as *Citizen and Morality.*

[3] Lee Kwan-yew officially promoted moral education, especially Confucian morality, in 1981, after acknowledging the deficiency of laws or policies alone. Since then, the Singapore government has established an institute specializing in this matter and included moral and religious education in the curriculum of secondary schools.

[4] See Yang Chung-sen , "Confucianism and National Modernization from the Legal Point of View," *Seminar on Confucianism and Modernization* (Taipei, 1986), p. 1. The traditional Chinese legal system was overwhelmingly molded by Confucianism and infused with ethical thinking in both its nature and contents. See also Hsiao Kung-ch'uan, *A History of Chinese Political Thought*, trans. F. W. Mote (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1979), 2 vols.

[5] Wei Cheng-tung, general editor of the *China Tribune,* stated: "In the context of our daily life, however, not even the minimum degree of observing the law and the custom of public morality can be maintained," in "Ethical Problems in Democratic Societies: The Path of Modernization of The Confucian Ethics," *Seminar on Confucianism and Modernization* (Taipei, 1986), abstract. According to the statistics of The Ministry of the Interior and The

Ministry of Justice (Center of Study of Criminal Problems), in the mid 1980s the crime rate among teenagers rose at the accelerated rate of more than 10%. See Ministry of Justice, *Statistics of Crimes in Taiwan* (1984), p. 267. See also the article of R. C. Hsieh, "Controlling Teen-age Policy," in *Seminar on Human-Social Sciences - Education in Secondary Schools* (Taiwan Normal University, 1986).

[6] I.e., the May Fourth Movement, which spread over China in the 1920s and broke up into different radical groups, some of which were strongly against traditional Chinese values.

[7] Thome Fang, "The Alienation of Man in Philosophy, Religion and Philosophical Anthropology," in *Creativity of Man and Nature* (Taipei: Linking, 1980).

[8] Cf. Shih C. T., ed., *Gung-ming Chiao-yu chi Chi-chian Wen-ti yu Dwei-tse* (Citizen-Education, Its Problems and Remedy Policy) (Taiwan: Bureau of Education of the Taiwan Province, 1985), 2 vols.

[9] Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (New York: Continuum, 1972), p. 1. See also Max Horkheimer, *Eclipse of Reason* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947).

[10] *Citizen and Morality*, p. 1

[11] *The Great Learning*, chap. 1. Trans. Chan Wing-tsit, in *A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963). Hereafter as Chan.

[12] *The Great Learning*, chap. 1; Chan, pp. 86-87.

[13] Chan, p. 84; See also Hsiao Kung-chuan, *A History of Chinese Politics*, vol. 1, Introduction.

[14] *The Great Learning*, chap. 1: "From the Son of Heaven down to the common people, all must regard cultivation of the personal life as the root of foundation." Chan, p. 87.

[15] Chu Hsi, *Da-xuye Chang-chu*, chap. 5; in Chan Wing-tsit, *Chu His Lwen-chi* (Collected Essays on Chu Hsi) (Taipei: Xuye-sheng Book Co., 1982); Wang Yang-ming, *Ch'uan-hsi Lu* (Instruction for Practical Living), sec. 129, 135-137, etc., quoted in Chan, pp. 84-85, notes 2 and 3.

[16] Han Fei-tzu Chi-chieh, in *Chu-tzu Chi-ch'eng*, vol. 5, chap. 54, p. 365, quoted by Benjamin Schwartz, *The World of Thought in Ancient China* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 323.

[17] *Ibid.*, p. 323.

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 382.

[19] *Mencius*, trans. Lau D. C., bk. 4, part 1, p. 118.

[20] *Mencius*; Lau, ibid., p. 117.

[21] Schwarzt, p. 341; *Han Fei-tzu*, chap. 49, p. 344.

[22] Niccolo Machiavelli, *The Prince*, trans. N. Hill Thomson (Oxford: Clarendon, 1913), p. 130; Juergen Habermas, *Theory and Practice*, trans. John Viertel (Boston: Beacon Press, 1973), p. 59.

[23] *Gung-ming Chiao-yu Chi-chian Wen-ti yu Dwei-tse*, vol. 1, p. 8.

[24] *Ibid.*, pp. 5-6.

[25] *Ibid.*, p. 1.

[26] *Citizen and Morality*, vol. 1, chap. 1, pp. 2-4.

[27] *The Analects*, 15:20: "The superior man seeks in himself; the inferior man seeks it in others." Chan, p. 43.

[28] Schwartz, p. 113.

[29] *Citizen and Morality*, vol. *1*, pp. 2-4.

[30] *Ibid.*, p. 2.

[31] Albert Chao, "On 'Chiao yu': An Inquiry into the Philosophical Foundation of Chinese Education," in *The Proceedings of the International Symposium on The Philosophical Foundation of Moral Education in China* (Taipei: Fujen University Press, 1985), pp. 44-45 (Chinese).

[32] "A Movement for the Renaissance of Chinese Culture" was organized headed by former R.O.C. President Yan Chia-kan. Its directives state that it will "make known The Three Principles of the People, Democracy and Freedom." Ku, the general editor of the series, states that the motives of the movement include to "spread the power and spirit of Chinese culture," overcoming communism and national unification. *Citizen and Morality*, pp. 6-9.

[33] Statistics of the Government Information Office (Taiwan) reveal that 85% of the students (of Taiwan's top universities) going to the United States of America for advanced study do not return. Report 17.10. 1982 of the Government Information Office of Taiwan.

[34] An exemplary case is seen by the establishing of 9 colleges in 1983. All are oriented to technology and engineering.

[35] *History of China for Middle School*, ed. Committee of Editors (Taipei: National Compile Institute, 1987).

[36] "Reinforcing National Consciousness." Directives of the Ministry of Education (Taipei, 1966).

[37] *San Dz ching* begins with Mencius' theory on human nature as Goodness: "At the very beginning, human nature is good."

[38] See *The Girl's High-School of Tai-Jung: Report on the Method of Citizen Educational Sciences in High School - A*

*Comparative Study* (Kao cheng Gung ming He hsuye Fang fa de Pi chiao Yan chiu Bao kao), 1986. It contains little information about the method of teaching, and nothing about teachers. Table 13 p. 22, indicates that a majority of 60% of the respondents believed: (a) the method is too passive, (b) there is hardly any engagement of the students, (c) there is no relation to social reality, and (d) the teachers do not care about the students.

[39] Twenty of the 26 members of the editorial committee of *Citizen and Morality Education* are professors (of Chinese, history and language) in universities.

[40] The main editors are officials, or high cadres of the Kuomingtang.

[41] The test done by the Department of Mathematics of National Taiwan University in 1980 reveals that professors of mathematics who have earned their Ph.D. in prestigious universities in the U.S. or Japan do not fare better than the student participants in the Joint College Entrance Examination

[42] According to the report of the Ministry of Finance, the economic crimes (fraudulence, bad checks, false bankruptcy) are dramatically increasing. In February 1967, there was an insignificant 2% decrease from the previous year. (See *China Times*, Feb. 22, 1987).

[43] English schools in Taiwan outnumber other preparatory schools. It is claimed that Taiwan Chinese are among the most successful participants in TOEFL.

[44] I have analyzed this problem in a previous article, in which I pointed out the double moral standard of the intellectual class. See Tran Van Doan, *Christian Mission and Higher Education in Taiwan* (Taiwan: Fujen University Press, 1986), p. 4.

[45] Cf. John B. Thompson, *Studies in the Theory of Ideology* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1984), p. 2.

[46] Karl Marx, *Deutsche Ideologie* (1845-46), in *MEW* 3, 20 or *MEW* 27, 460 ff., *MEW* 21, 179.

[47] Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia* (New York: Hartcourt Brace, 1936).

[48] *Deutsche Ideologie*, *MEW* 3, 26; *Die heilige Familie*, *MEW* 2, 55; *Zur Kritik der politischen Okonomie* (1859), *MEW* 13, 9, Vorwort.

[49] Boris Souvarine, "Ideology of Soviet Communism," *Dictionary of the History of Ideas* (New York: Scribner's, 1973), vol. 2, pp. 559-564.

[50] Cf. M. Rejai, 'Ideology', in *Dictionary of the History of*

*Ideas*, op. cit., pp. 552-559, esp. p. 553.

[51] Francis Bacon, *Novum Organum*, I, 38-68. According to Bacon, there are four types of idols: 1) idols of the tribe, 2) idols of the cave or den, 3) idols of the marketplace, and 4) idols of the theatre.

[52] Etienne Bonnet de Condillac, *Treatise on Sensations*, trans. G. Carr (London: Favel, 1930), I, iii, p. 1.

[53] Pierre J.G. Cabanis, *Rapport du physique et du moral de l'homme*, in *Oeuvres*, ed. Thurot, Paris 1823-25. Cabanis' famous phrase: 'Les nerfs – voila tout l'homme'.

[54] Destutt de Tracy , *Elements d' ideologie* (1801-1815), 4 vols.

[55] Claude Adrien Helvetius, *De l'homme, de ses facultes et de son education* (1772), trans. *On Man*, 2, 7, trans. Hooper, 1777, I, p. 127.

[56] K. Popper, *Conjectures and Refutations* (New York: Harper and Row, 1968).

[57] K. Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia*, pp. 55-56, 265-66.

[58] *Ibid.*, p. 60.

[59] Tran Van Doan, "Ideology, Interests and Morality," in *The Proceedings of the International Symposium on The Philosophical Foundation of Moral Education*, op. cit., pp. 115-136.

[60] Tran Van Doan, "Habermas' Theory of Consensus," in *Philosophical Review* (1989), pp.

[61] *The Analects*, 1:12; 2:5, etc.

[62] *Ibid.* 3:3; 3:4.

[63] *Ibid.*2:1, etc.

[64] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics,* book II, 1103b.

[65] Bernard Haring, "Morality," in *Sacramentum Mundi*, IV (New York: Herder, 1968), p. 112.

[66] Immanuel Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* , trans. H.J. Paton (New York: Harper &Row, 1948).

[67] Kant himself had acknowledged: "Das mag in der Theorie richtig sein, taught aber nicht fuer die Praxis," in E. Kant, *Gesammelte Schriften*, VI, pp. 221, 35-56.

[68] *The Analects*, 6:18; Chan, p. 30: "To know (it) is not as good as to love (it), and to love (it) is not as good as to take delight in it."

[69] Juergen Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests*, trans. J. Shapiro (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971).

[70] Juregen Habermas, *Towards a Reconstruction of Historical Materialism* (Frankfurt: Surkamp, 1976), German text.

[71] Juergen Habermas, *Theory of Communicative Action*, trans. T. McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984), vol. I.

[72] Juergen Habermas, *Theory and Practice*, p. 254.

[73] *Knowledge and Human Interests*, pp. 310, 314.

[74] Theodor Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, tr. E. B. Ashton (New York: Continuum, 1973), part 2.

[75] Ernst Bloch, *Das Prinzip Hoffnung* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1959), pp. 129ff.

[76] Karl Popper, *The Open Society and Its Enemies* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1966).

[77] *Knowledge and Human Interests*, p. 211.

[78] *Ibid.*, p. 205.

[79] *Ibid.*, p. 212.

[80] Juergen Habermas, *Technik und Wissenschaft als Ideologie* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1969), pp. 146-148; *Knowledge and Human Interests*, Appendix, p. 303.

[81] *Theory and Practice*, p. 111.

[82] *Knowledge and Human Interests*, Appendix, p. 313.

[83] *Theory and Practice*, p. 111.

[84] *Ibid.*, Introduction. See also Richard Bernstein, *Beyond Objectivism and Relativism* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983), pp. 190 ff.; Tran Van Doan, "Praxis and Hsing," paper presented at the *Fourth International Conference on Chinese Philosophy*, New York, 1985.

[85] Despite his reconstruction of materialism on the more speculative level. See Habermas, *Zur Rekonstruktion des historischen Materialismus* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1976).

[86] Juergen Habermas, *Theory of Communicative Action* and *Knowledge and Human Interests*, Appendix.

[87] *Ibid.*, vol. I, part III, esp. pp. 385ff.

[88] *Theory of Communicative Action*, p. 143ff.

[89] *Ibid.*, pp. 55-101, 397-98.

[90] Lawrence Kohlberg, "From Is to Ought: How to Commit the Naturalistic Fallacy and Get Away With It in the Study of Moral Development" in Th. Mischel, ed., *Cognitive Development and Epistemology* (New York: Academic Press, 1971), Jean Piaget, *The Principles of Genetic Epistemology* (New York, 1972).

[91] Lawrence Kohlberg, *The Psychology of Moral Development* (New York: Harper and Row, 1984).

[92] Cf. Juergen Habermas, *Theory of Communicative Action* (German edition), vol. II, p. 260, quoted from Kohlberg, *Zur Kognitiven Entwicklung des Kindes* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1974).

[93] Jean Piaget, *The Principles of Genetic Epistemology, op. cit.*, cf. B. Kaplan, "Meditation on Genesis" in *Human Development*, 10 (1967), p. 65. Nathan Rotenstreich, "An Analysis of Piaget's Concept of Structure," in *Philosophical and Phenomenological Research*, 37 (1977), p. 368ff.

[94] Jean Piaget, *Introduction a l'epistemologie genetique* (Paris: P.U.F., 1953), p. 189.

[95] Juergen Habermas, *Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns*, vol. I, pp. 76, 104-110, 200ff., 249, 324; Vol. II, pp. 21, 50, 218, 588.

[96] *Ibid.*, vol. II, p. 260; vol. I, p. 250.

[97] *Ibid.*, p. 260.

[98] Tran Van Doan, "Harmony and Consensus," in *The Asian Journal of Philosophy* (Taipei, Manila, Tokyo, Seoul: 1987), I, 101-130.

[99] *The Great Learning;* Chan, p. 85.

[100] *The Doctrine of the Mean*, Chap. 13; Chan, p. 101.

[101] *The Great Learning*; Chan, p. 86.

[102] *The Analects*, 7:22; Chan, p. 32.

[103] *Ibid.*, 6:7; Chan, p. 29.

[104] *Ibid.*, 2:4; Chan, p. 22.

[105] *Ibid.*,7:15; Chan, p. 32.

[106] *Ibid.*, 7:27; Chan, p. 3-33.

[107] *The Doctrine of the Mean*, chap. 13.

[108] *Ibid.*, chap. 13; Chan, p. 101.

[109] *The Analects*, 13:18; Chan, p. 41.

[110] *Ibid.*, 13:23; Chan, p. 41.

[111] *Ibid.*, 13:6; Chan, p. 41.

[112] Karl Marx: "Jeder nach seinen Faehigkeiten, jedem nach seinen Beduerfnissen." See also *The Doctrine of the Mean*, chap. 17; Chan, p. 102: "Thus it is that he who possesses great virtue will certainly attain to a corresponding position, wealth, fame and long life."

[113] *The Doctrine of the Mean, ibid.*

[114] *Ibid.*, chap. 1; Chan, p. 98.

[115] *Ibid.*

[116] *Ibid.*

[117] *The Analects,* 12:2; Chan, p. 20.

[118] *Ibid.*, 12:2; Chan, p. 39.

[119] Tung Chung-shu, *op. cit.*, chap. 56; Chan, p. 286.

[120] *The Doctrine of the Mean*, chap. 13.

[121] *Ibid.*, chap. 20; Chan, p. 105.

[122] *Ibid.*

[123] *Ibid.* chap. 1; Chan, p. 98.

[124] For a detailed study, see Fu Pei-jung, *The Concept of T'ien in Ancient China* (Yale University Ph.D. Dissertation, 1985).

[125] *The Great Learning*; Chan, p. 86.