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THE POVERTY OF IDEOLOGICAL EDUCATION

by
TRAN VAN DOAN

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Dulcissima mater mea!

PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Education has always been a burning issue and an obsessive preoccupation in my life. I still remember my childhood, growing up in violence, my innocence tainted with ideological doctrines. The Chinese and Vietnamese system of education and schools were fabricated after the model of Nazi concentration camps in which the teacher knew more about torture than pedagogy. Like my schoolmates, I went through primary, middle and high school in fear, despair and, curiously, hope, the hope of being liberated. All I can remember are long hours of indoctrination, self-confession and self-torture brought on by all kinds of imagined sins preached by the teachers. Yet, ironically such a horrible education was never despised in our country. We were so accustomed to it that we unconsciously took it for granted. The “success” of such an indoctrination was verified by the effectiveness of such products as “models,” “patriots,” “heroes”... and by the evidence of uniform thinking. This “success” was hailed and sanctified as virtue. One blindly believed and tried to defend it.

I was far from exempt from it. In fact, in my first writing on education, I argued for ideological training. I blamed the Western liberal education for its “irresponsibility.” I turned a blind eye on the idolization of Mao Dze-dung, Ho Chi Minh, Kim Il-sung, Chiang Kai-shek and other leaders in Asia, which I mistakenly took as a matter of belief shared by most. I looked at Lee Kwan-yew of Singapore as a model Confucian, and I firmly embraced the principles of stability, order, and discipline as the most sacred doctrines for politics as taught by Confucius in *The Analects*.¹

Fortunately, I did not need David Hume to wake me up from the slumber of dogmatism as did Immanuel Kant. The tragedy of the Cultural Revolution launched by a divinized Mao, the crimes committed by our “dear leaders,” be they the “great” Kim of North Korea or the new “savior” Polpot of Cambodia, be they the generals in most Asian countries or the colonels of Latin America, all demonstrated a sad fact: indoctrination is nothing but an instrument of repression used by our leaders to acquire power and accumulate their interests. In essence, ideology plays the sword of Damocles; hidden in its manifest form, one discovers the satanic soul of Machiavellian politics.

In China, the long, dark winter of totalitarianism seems to be ending as the idols are stripped of their divinity in the light of day.

Infallible Mao, Generalissimo Chiang, indomitable Teng, one by one, are subjected to criticism by their own “lambs,” their power decreased and their messianic magic, heroism, patriotism, omniscience, etc.—once carefully choreographed and glorified by their followers—now vaporized under sunlight. The “unedited” history reveals the unseen banality and hypocrisy of our godlike idols. Sadly enough, their tumble has not helped much in destroying idolization; one simply replaces Bacon’s idols of the theater by idols of the forum. Like Nietzsche who pessimistically asked, how could one declare “the death of god” if “theism” is still accepted,² we question our education: how can Mao be demystified when the “sacred” Maoism is still the syllabus of our education? How could Richard Wagner and Nietzsche convince us of the “twilight of gods” (*Gotterdammerung*) if the new gods are still emerging?³ The caricature painted by us has taken on a life of its own, which makes of us, its fabricator, a self-caricature.

Thus, the hope for an end to idols seems rather utopian as long as their metaphysical foundation is still unquestioned, i. e. as long as there is still a belief in the heaven-mandate and our ideology remains uncriticized. The immunity of Maoism from any criticism demonstrated that ideology enjoys the absolute power once assigned to religion. As such, its authority imposed on the masses could not be challenged. This historical fact confirms rather than destroys idolatry. Thus, it is no surprise that the worship reserved for God is “naturally” applied to the leader, be he an anyone (*quicumque*) or a someone (*homo quidam*). We witnessed how the idolatry of a “someone” named Mao is passed to another one called Teng. To the scholars well versed in Chinese culture, such a phenomenon is by no means unique. It is so common that only a few may raise eyebrows about it. Neither the revolution of 1911, nor the cultural movement of 1966; neither the collapse of the Man-Ching dynasty, nor the “victory” of the Communists in Mainland China could have destroyed the essence of idolatry. All they could do is replace one idol with another.

We may be optimistic by putting more hope in recent developments. The *Tiananmen* incident, the recently acquired democratic spirit in Eastern Europe and the massive investment in higher education are of great help in urging the intellectuals critically to reflect on the essence of idolatry, i.e. on ideology itself. This dismissal of idols could last forever if such of its metaphysical principles as the Mandate of Heaven are destroyed. The demythologization of leaders and henceforth the crusade for

democracy can be successful only if every form of ideology, be it Marxism-Leninism or Maoism, Confucianism or Nationalism are challenged. The business of criticism has to be reinvented, as Marx insisted: "We do not anticipate the world dogmatically, but rather wish to find the new world through the criticism of the old."⁴ The collapse of the communist empire and its unfulfilled promise of a terrestrial Eden again confirmed the truth in Marx's ardent critique of ideology. Ironically, the death of Marxism-Leninism (as an ideology) was a logical consequence of Marx's radical objection to any form of ideology.

Our question is whether Marxist ideology really is dead, or simply transformed into another ideology. Such a question could shed some light on Mannheim's paradox that even Marx could not escape: that Marxist ideology is born in Marx's critique of ideology.⁵

Thus, we are not so naive as to believe in the immanent death of ideology, nor in its most effective means, ideological education. Our strategy will be critico-constructive in that we will eliminate the negative aspects of the ideologies embraced by China, i.e. Confucianism and Marxism, by means of critique, but at the same time we will take apart its positive elements to reconstruct a theory which could be of help for education in our modern age.

This book has been written over a quarter century of tragedy and joy, of despair and hope. Some chapters the author wrote in fear and despair, and he dared not make them public. Only after some liberalizations (such as the lifting of martial law in Taiwan), has he ventured to let some parts of the bulky manuscript be published, and then mostly in English, with only a few chapters in Chinese and those substantially altered. Such alteration reflects the process of maturation but also the prudence of the writer. Such prudence is imperative because dogmatism never dies, but pretends to sleep like a predator in hibernation. Dogmatism can be appeased only by means of rational education.

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NOTES

¹ *The Analects*, 1:4; 1:6; 1:8; 1:12.

² Friedrich Nietzsche, *Also sprach Zarathustra*, 372; or *Die Froehliche Wissenschaft*, 125.

³ Friedrich Nietzsche, *Gotterdammerung*, 7: "Wie ist der Mensch nur ein Fehlgriff Gottes ? Oder Gott nur ein Fehlgriff des Menschen?"

⁴ Karl Marx, Letter to Ruge, in *Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society*, trans. and ed. L.D. Easton and K.H. Guddat, (New York, 1967), p. 212.5.

⁵ Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia*, (New York, 1936).

CHAPTER I

REFLECTIONS ON THE NATURE OF IDEOLOGY

PROLOGUE

The history of Chinese education has been one of ideological indoctrination. The expression sounds too harsh, but it reflects the historical facts. Until the educational revolution initiated by Tsai Yuan-fei (1876-1940) at the beginning of the twentieth century, Chinese education was no more than ideological training aimed at establishing a bureaucracy, training technocrats and defending the interests of the rulers. Despite Tsai's appeal for a pure education and for science, Chinese education continues along this traditional path. It is a well-established truism of our history that Chinese education is an ideological education in disguise, a disguise which fell off in the Tiananmen massacre (1989)¹ and even earlier in the so-called Cultural Revolution (1966-76), the Chinese holocaust.² Its ugly soul is gradually exposed when the students resort to protest and revolt to reject the tightly controlled system of education adopted by both communists and nationalists. The military presence in school, the long required hours of political brainwashing, the over-burdened classes of militarism and authoritarianism, all show that education for freedom, for the sake of knowledge (Wilhelm von Humboldt, 1767-1835), or for democracy (John Dewey, 1859-1952) are either strange words or simple rhetoric.³ This chapter aims to depict a clear picture of the nature of ideology and its power. It is the first step in demarcating the line between moral and ideological education and, consequently, in revealing the hidden but explosive danger implicit in ideological education adopted by authoritarian rulers.

The Search for the Correct Idea

The term "ideology," first used by the French Encyclopedists, has been unfortunate, ambiguous and contradictory. Before the Encyclopedists, ideology had been understood by Francis Bacon (1561-1626) as both positive and negative. He conceived of ideology in terms of a critique of false *idola*, of fallacious arguments. But his severe attack against the *idola tribus*, *idola fori* and *idola theatri* served as a means to work out the correct idea.⁴ The French

Encyclopedists further developed Bacon's idea by identifying ideology as the most correct system of ideas, which serves as the foundation of our knowledge and as the guideline of conduct. Such an understanding of ideology remained uncontested until Karl Marx (1818-1883), who saw ideology as a sheer reactionary force, a naked instrument fabricated by the rulers to serve their interests. It is also the false consciousness of the oppressed class which seeks satisfaction in it.⁵ Marx's violent assault on ideology does not, however, dismiss its magic seduction. Ironically, the most ardent and fanatical believers in ideology are Marx's followers. With them, ideology rediscovers its positive character in what they proudly named Marxism-Leninism, a system of ideas which claims to be the ultimate science, providing the principles of human society, or better, of the proletariat.⁶ However, once again history proves that such an ideology is instead a great myth, the "false" consciousness of the twentieth century. Contrary to its boast, communism could neither satisfy human needs nor meet scientific criteria. In its nature, one finds a fascist soul; beneath its humanist appearance is hidden a demon. In the light, it appears as an even more rigid and brutal system of defending the interests of the rulers. It is exactly the false ideology that its founder, Marx, had tried to destroy.⁷

The controversy on the nature of ideology demands thorough reflection. Here we shall defend the thesis that ideology is historically and consecutively both positive and negative. By studying its genetic development, its effectiveness and its obsolescence, we shall try to incorporate into a more systemic body of human cognitive development both Karl Mannheim's (1893-1947)⁸ thesis of ideology as social structure (of either a particular or a total character) and Paul Ricoeur's (1913-)⁹ thesis of ideology as social function and cultural imagination. Consequently, we seek to reject the theme developed, but not followed through, by Marx and Daniel Bell, i.e. the end of ideology,¹⁰ by proving that we cannot escape ideology, but that we can criticize the old one and build a new one.

The Birth of Ideology

The French Encyclopedists were not the first to invent ideology, even though the term ideology is strongly associated with their works. Actually, they followed Bacon who had replaced false *idola* with correct ideas constructed on experience and experiment. Thus, to Bacon, ideology must be a system or, at least, a study of correct ideas with the double function of preventing false idols and

guiding true knowledge.¹¹ The Encyclopedists went a step further by holding the view that the correct idea must be built on human nature. Therefore, like Bacon, they embraced a double task of criticising a false understanding of human nature and then looking for the true human nature. Etienne Bonnet de Condillac (1715-1780) argued that Bacon and John Locke (1632-1704) had not gone far enough in locating the source of ideas in experience and observation. According to Condillac, the source should be human sensations.¹² Pierre Cabanis and Antoine Louis Claude Destutt de Tracy systematised Condillac's philosophical sensism, while Claude Adrien Helvetius applied it to politics.¹³ To Cabanis, physical sensibility is the basic factor not only in knowledge, but also in human intellectual and moral life.¹⁴ De Tracy was much more radical in viewing ideology as part of zoology; human psychology, i.e. "the science of ideas", should be studied in biological terms. In a word, human nature is simply identified with human sensations and the human mind is understood in "psychological" (i.e. physical) terms. Not surprisingly, they dismissed the concept of human nature in religion as unscientific and nonsensical.

It is sufficient to note here the ambiguity and contradiction of their ideology in their confusion of physiology, psychology and epistemology.

Actually, with the Encyclopedists, ideology replaced the Platonic Idea and claimed the power of the Christian God. It assumed the role of guiding human conduct and furthering human knowledge. Whether such a claim is justified is up to science and history to judge. The fact that Napoleon Bonaparte pejoratively labeled the group "ideologues," i.e. visionaries and day-dreamers, was not quite unjustified.

Ideology or the System of Correct Idea?

As a matter of fact, the intellectuals of the modern age did not invent ideology, but turned Platonism upside down by giving to the Idea a body instead of a mind. They showed that the true, correct idea must be constructed *a posteriori* from the human senses. At the heart of their theory, they still shared Plato's insight by holding fast to the view that only their idea is correct and that as such it could serve as the foundation of human life. The validity of ideology is therefore unquestioned. Their idea that the reality of human senses must be the true one and that this idea has to represent the concrete facts of human nature is clearly Platonic in reverse. The

struggle against Platonism, led by Bacon with his *Novum Organum*, actually confirmed the Platonic logic. Though it tried to restore the role of experience dismissed earlier by Platonic thinkers, it still followed the logic that there should be an Archimedian point which is none other than their idea. In these terms one can understand the mood of the scientific world at that time where the triumph of experimentalism in physics and astronomy justified the belief that experience and experiments provide the new correct idea. Ideology understood as a system of correct ideas is still embraced today.

The Process

Our question centers on two points: how did they come to such an idea and how could they have absolutized it as the most fundamental, the unique concept. This is to question not only the procedure of the birth of ideology, but also the reason for this step. The answers could be of great importance in explaining the positive and negative character of ideology. The first answer deals precisely with the process of discovery of the idea, while the second deals with the process of indoctrination.

First, we cannot naively accuse Plato of being a day-dreamer or an unscientific visionary. As a matter of fairness, we must accept the fact that he discovered the theory of ideas not simply by imagination, but through a long critical examination of all the theories about the universe available to him in his time. Unsatisfied with the simple explanations of his predecessors, he developed further the view that there must be a point of departure or something which serves as the foundation of the universe.¹⁵ However, such a thing should not be a simple appearance such as water, air, number or whatever. Obviously, such a way of doing philosophy was tacitly adopted by most of the scientists of his time and perhaps even today. The obsession with an Archimedian point has always been the hallmark of scientists and ideologues alike. Descartes' *Ego cogitans*, Leibniz's monad, Newton's mechanics have been thought of as the Archimedian point for a new science, and this kind of thinking has been justified by the tremendous advance of science, and by the refinement of thinking. However, its success often is accompanied by a danger of stagnancy, and, especially, a tendency towards negative ideology. The fact that such a way of doing research is far from perfect is seen in its tendency to regard useful ideas as eternally valid and true. Faithful to the premise (correct idea), only a certain method (analytic) is accepted. Such a way of

thinking is conservative, deterministic,¹⁶ and not always correct due to its incompleteness.¹⁷ Since Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) and Kurt Godel (1906-1978),¹⁸ philosophers and scientists agree that: (1) what philosophers and scientists observe does not appear in its full reality. As we know only a part of a phenomenon's partial appearance, any conclusion based simply on our observation of the phenomenon may be correct in some aspect, but incorrect in others. (2) The fact that the observer often is influenced by his social, historical and cultural milieu in perceiving the object, in judging and classifying its appearance, means that our knowledge of the thing often is pre-determined and hence biased. (3) Peter Winch (1926-) noted another fatal mistake, i.e. the category mistake of analogy and synthesis to our knowledge.¹⁹ We are often seduced by the ease of comparing phenomenal appearances or unrelated things according to some categories which are often invented by us, while ignoring that the thing known by us does not have exactly the same characteristics as the other unknown thing. Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) might have been correct in insisting on the unknowableness of the thing. Our point is, the alpha point sought by scientists and philosophers cannot be regarded as the ultimate reality playing the foundation-role of all things. Such mistakes render the procedure of research and observation fallacious. Therefore, we can conclude that ideology may be fallacious if its genetic construction is wrongly understood or falsely perceived.

We may go a further step to say that this fallacy is double in character: (1) The beginning of the procedure of ideological construction is mistakenly conceived and analyzed by scientists and philosophers due to incomplete observation, biased pre-understanding and one-sided judgment. (2) Even if our observation of the phenomenon seems to be correct and complete and if the appearance of the thing seems to fit our theory, it is still too early to draw a conclusion. We are often tempted by the desire for success to forget that no conclusion can be drawn as long as we do not firmly grasp the whole process of change in the thing and as long as it is not yet tested. Often a religious or political ideologue commits such a mistake in drawing conclusions too soon regardless of the problems of data-incompleteness, logical fallacy, category-mistakes, etc.

Second, after having discovered the Archimedian point, the scientist applies his theory in relevant fields, but his application serves primarily as a test. Only when his theory stands up to the tests can he generalize it.²⁰ The ideologue does the same by following the same procedure, and he may be rigorously scientific.

However, a close look manifests a big difference between the ideologue and the scientist. On the one hand, the scientist tries to apply his theory only to the relevant field while the ideologue prefers to generalize his theory and extend it to all fields, preferably practical fields. The ideologue conceives of ideology as a body of political, moral and religious beliefs. On the other hand, the scientist often revises his theory in light of new discoveries or when it appears ineffective or irrelevant.²¹ He reexamines not only the conclusion but also the procedure. In contrast, the ideologue stands inert to new discovery, and is reactionary with regard to ineffectiveness or irrelevancy. He may blame the subordinate executor for wrongdoing by insisting on the absolute correctness of his theory.

The Dialectic of Ideology

In saying that ideology, in its genesis, bears a remarkable resemblance to science we want to make the point that ideology is not quite false in its developmental phase. However, a clarification of its scientific status must be made here. Ideology is not science, especially not exact science. The claim of Marxists on the scientific-status of their ideology is, in Marx's mind, unjustified.²² Of course, Friedrich Engels (1820-1895) might have inclined to this version of Marxist science in his *Dialectics of Nature*, but such a claim contradicts Marx's understanding of human science as a branch of human knowledge acquired from human activities which are variable and developmental. The fact that ideology is correct in some phase or aspect, and equally incorrect in some other phase or aspect, confirms our point that ideology can be understood and judged from the point of view of its genetic process.

By focusing on the process and not on the conclusion of ideology, we further claim that there is no absolute ideology and that any effort to absolutize it will transform it to the negative one. Our claim is based on the arguments that ideology is not accidentally or randomly fabricated, but empirically constructed, which means that it is bound socially and historically. Thus, it is logical to conclude that it appears correct at its very first developmental phase and in some particular social aspect; however, due to historical and social change, it becomes incorrect in the long run. As Marx objected, it reveals its negative, ugly face, when it resists new human activities and hence new world-views and, consequently, jeopardizes human progress.

To prove our thesis, we will proceed first with a critical

examination of such forms of ideology as culture, morals and aesthetics in which the two traits of correctness and incorrectness, positive and negative, appear consecutively in a dialectical manner.

Cultural Ideology

The fact that culture is almost indefinable is due not only to its richness and complexity, but also to its dynamic characteristics. Culture is in its first phase a process of synthesizing human experiences, evaluating and reevaluating them. In the second phase, culture either surfaces in the form of such common values as language and art, or is expressed in a hidden form and at a deeper level of human consciousness. In a third phase, culture is identified with the *Zeitgeist*, i.e. the most common or universal expression of history. Although we would not follow Hegel (1770-1831) in claiming the universality of culture, we hold that culture expresses at least a human effort of building common values based on their successful experience in dealing with problems, satisfying human needs and defending their interests. Thus, we understand culture not only in terms of language (Clifford Geertz), or morals (Confucianism), or technology (civilization), or arts, but more precisely all forms of human commonality which bear the above described functions and characteristics. The cultural analysis of Kroeber and Kluckhohn results in an over-production of 300 definitions and 164 concepts.²³ Actually, these definitions and concepts are worked out from what we mean by human forms of commonality in (1) dealing with human problems, (2) satisfying basic human needs, (3) defending human interests and (4) looking for a better life.

The effectiveness of our ways of dealing with problems secures the function and the validity of culture. That means that as long as culture is effective, it is accepted as something relating to our life. Otherwise, it would be regarded as a museum piece. In this context, we can say that culture bears a remarkable resemblance to ideology. Its genetic process is rooted in human modes of problem-solving, and its validity is almost identical with its effectiveness.

One may object to our interpretation of culture from the point of view of problem-solving by raising the question of its effectiveness. A great deal of traditional cultural values are no longer effective in dealing with our present problems. Should we reject them as non-cultural just because of their ineffectiveness; should all cultures be effective in dealing with human problems?

It would not be difficult, however, to point out that such an

argument begs the question. First, one overlooks an important feature of culture: Unlike a matter which may be entirely dissolved, culture will never completely disappear. It is better to say that culture is transformed or enriched instead of dying off. A brief survey of our own culture would verify our understanding: our present day culture is rooted in old values, enriched with new values acquired from recent human efforts at problem-solving, and open to all possible new values. The example of Chinese filial piety confirms the above view: instead of being swept away by new and modern imported ideas as predicted by many Western-educated Chinese scholars, such as the members of May-Fourth Movement, it survives. But, of course, it does not remain intact in its old form; it no longer claims to be the sole structure of the family. In fact, it is transformed by absorbing new ideas on family, on the relationship between parents and children, etc., into a less rigid, less formal and more flexible kind of filial piety. Today, most Chinese still consider filial piety as the quintessence of familial structure, but they no longer accept its old form or regard it as the nucleus of the modern family. We still regard it as indispensable, but no longer as a unique value.²⁴ Second, filial piety is still effective in solving family problems: conflict between family members is still solved by means of the parents' authority, or by the recognition of such family codes as filial piety. Further, filial piety could play a particular role in education and indirectly in solving social problems.²⁵ The recent crisis of education stems mostly from neglect of family-education, and consequently from its erosion.²⁶ The classic example of Mencius (317-289 B.C.) who was primarily educated by his mother is still accepted by Chinese culture as an effective model of education and of social problem-solving. The success of the overseas Chinese justifies the effectiveness of family-education.

Moral Ideology

Analogously, we may say that even morals are not *a priori* laws, but rather a set of solutions constructed *a posteriori* by social beings to deal with their problems.²⁷ The process of moral construction or the process of moralisation bears a remarkable resemblance to the process of ideological construction.

Generally, one may take morals to be a set of laws imposed by mythical gods, as in primitive societies or in earlier Greek civilization, and faithfully execute them. However, in the light of new studies on the nature of mythology by anthropologists,

theologians such as Rudolf Bultmann, and especially by Freudian depth-psychologists, these seemingly *a priori* moral laws are actually seen to be constructed *a posteriori* on a set of agreements—voluntary or involuntary—by the members involved in social conflicts. They are “voluntary,” “autonomous,” and “conscientious” if both parts of the community reach agreement on the basis of equality in power, interest, and free decision. They are “involuntary,” “ideological,” and “alienated” if the agreement is attained by means of violence, or external force, and if it does not reflect the interests of the ruled. The first kind of morals is sought after and defended by Aristotle, while the second kind is characteristic of authoritarian society. Marx dismissed this second kind of morals which he labeled “class-morals.”²⁸

The point is that though Aristotelian morals looked promising, they could not have generated the expected effects. In contrast, the second kind of morals has gained a strong foothold in human history: Nicolo Machiavelli's *Realpolitik* is based on this kind of morals. The question about the impracticality of Aristotle's morals and the effectiveness of Machiavelli's individual utilitarianism leads us to the meta-foundation of morals: morals are no more and no less than a set of rules dealing with human problems. They can be, like ideology, effective or ineffective depending on historical circumstances, on people's willingness to accept them and, more importantly, on whether they can solve human conflicts. *A priori* morals often are rejected, partly because they do not reflect reality, but most importantly, because they cannot solve human problems without coercion, violence, penalties, etc. Thus, we tend to *a posteriori* morals. *A posteriori* morals are not imposed, but mainly are accepted by us as a form of conventional agreement. We freely accept such morals, because they help solve our problems, or prevent us from committing mistakes. Their genetic process proceeds from the human effort of solving some puzzle, some anomaly or strange conduct. Thus, like the process of scientific discovery, morals are born from how we deal with our problems.

More concretely, we may formulate their genetic process as follows. First, we sense something wrong by discovering some anomalies in our life. We launch an investigation into it and may discover its reasons. We then think of a solution and apply it to solve our problems. If this goes well, we may adopt it again and again every time such a crisis reappears. If it proves to be ineffective, then we may look for another solution. In the first case, the effective solution is accepted as a model or a standard to deal with problems

at its very first step. Slowly, it becomes a kind of custom unchallenged by the community. It then becomes a kind of law if it meets no resistance and is still effective. The example of filial piety in Confucian society is a case in point. The conflict between parents and children is "normal" due to the growth of children, to their different world view, interests, etc. But the parents may regard such a conflict which jeopardizes their own interests as disturbing. To avoid such a conflict, they discover a kind of solution: educating the children to be obedient and to revere them. Such a solution seems to be very effective since the children themselves, once indoctrinated, believe they ought to do so. In fact, the children follow such a standard not only because they are taught, but because they may discover that they too could benefit from such a solution. They may be entitled to inherit the wealth left behind by their parents, and they may also find it relevant in dealing with their own children. Such a solution is then accepted by the community, and with time it becomes a kind of rule or law. It binds morally; *de facto* and *de jure* it is a moral law.²⁹

In a word, the process of moralisation begins with a human attempt to find a solution to a certain conflict, and ends with the human effort of institutionalising such a solution. Filial piety becomes a moral law governing the conduct of the children, the symbol of parent-child relationships, and the fundamental principle of family.³⁰

However, such a moral, because of its *a posteriori* characteristics, could easily be contested if it is no longer valid or effective in solving our continually emerging problems. In fact, it is better to say, such a moral may be of little use in solving some problems if it no longer possesses the absolute power it claims. The problems arise mostly from the part of the ruled, say, the children. They may find filial piety more a burden than a benefit—and consequently they try to abolish or ignore it. Sensing the danger of a loss of authority, the parents may resort to the policy of carrot and stick and even to institutionalization to defend filial piety. It is at this stage that filial piety becomes a kind of ideology.

Science as Ideology

The birth of science was hailed as an emancipation from religious and philosophical ideology (Auguste Comte, 1798-1857), and the new scientific age was proudly named the age of *Enlightenment*. However, the euphoria quickly eroded and science itself began to be doubted.³¹ The reason is simple: science is

“scientific” only in terms of its process, but not in its claims.³² Once it absolutizes itself as the ultimate purpose—once it assumes the role of God—it becomes *scientism*, a theory which claims absolute power to determine the fate of mankind. Evidently, scientism too is a kind of ideology.³³

Here, we may inquire into the reason for such a twist: how could science as an anti-ideological force degenerate into a form of ideology? We will argue that even science could not be exempted from ideology, and that a positive ideology bears remarkably scientific characteristics. To be more clear, we tend to the idea that science is itself a kind of ideology, while scientism as degenerated science is a form of negative ideology. To explain the dramatic change from science to scientism, from positive to negative ideology, we have to discuss the nature of science. Here we are inclined to the view of Karl Popper (1902-1994) that what determines the scientific is not ‘scientific knowledge’ but its procedure of verification and justification: “One can sum up by saying that the criterion of the scientific status of a theory is its falsifiability, or refutability, or testability.”³⁴

Here we wish neither to agree or disagree with Popper’s overall position, but simply wish to show that science is positive as long as it is in the process of discovery. Popper’s idea is ideological too,³⁵ but it is a positive ideology.

The second point is that we need some ideology, even in the world of science, just in order to carry on the project of science. We need some kind of conventional rules or meta-languages just as we need tradition. A breakthrough in science, say a revolution as Thomas Kuhn (1922-) insisted,³⁶ is possible not, as Paul Feyerabend (1924-1994) cynically suggested,³⁷ by accident, but by a permanent critical reflection on the meta-language, meta-structure, and meta-logic used in traditional science. That means that we need to rely on our previous knowledge to do science, but that we are not allowed to stop short on this kind of meta-language. We have to explore further and adopt the view that science is in a permanent revolution (Popper). This means that we have to take the stand of anti-ideology: to rest on a certain kind of knowledge, even the most certain knowledge, is to fall into the trap of negative ideology. Here we side with Imre Lakatos (1922-1974) in arguing: “The proving power of the intellect or the senses was questioned by the skeptics more than two thousand years ago; but they were browbeaten into confusion by the glory of the Newtonian physics. The success of Albert Einstein (1879-1955) again turned the tables and now very

few philosophers or scientists still think that scientific knowledge is, or can be, proven knowledge. But few realize that with this the whole classical structure of intellectual values falls in ruins and has to be replaced, one cannot simply water down the ideal of proven truth—as some logical empiricists do—to the ideal of ‘probable truth’ or—as some sociologists of knowledge do—to truth by (changing) consensus.”³⁸

Lakatos’ view is close to the thesis of Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900-) that we cannot escape from tradition³⁹ just as we cannot escape from positive ideology.⁴⁰ Thus, our main argument will follow the line that we cannot blindly take Marx’s view for granted and reject all kinds of ideology. What we propose is to criticize such an ideology, to review it and to transform it as Hegel might have done.

Aesthetic Ideology

Since Nietzsche,⁴¹ arts are no longer understood in terms of categories established by the faculty of knowledge,⁴² but in terms of the human faculty of conceiving, which is infinite and undefined. Francois Lyotard (1924-), following Nietzsche and Martin Heidegger (1889-1976), goes even so far as to claim that arts aim at “the sublime” and that the project of synthesizing aesthetic experiences into a unity which determines beauty is destined to be doomed.⁴³ Actually, Lyotard has dramatized the antinomy of the two faculties of conceiving and presenting, and consequently the antagonism between arts as “the sublime” and arts as the “beautiful.” He fails to discover an internal relationship between the two faculties and hence between the sublime and the beautiful. Let us explain his failure by relying on the human power of discovering “the sublime” and the human faculty of expressing or presenting “the beautiful.”

First, it is true that artistic feeling cannot be adequately presented in our language and judged by our established categories. The unexpressed sublime clearly shows the limit of language and the obsolescence of categories. However, to deny a common feeling of the sublime just because we have no adequate language to present the sublime is erroneous. Lyotard ignores the fact that our inability to present the sublime comes rather from our inexperience. The first time we encounter some new spectacle, we are always “surprised,” “astonished.” There is simply no language to express or present our feeling. However, were we to encounter that same spectacle often, it would no longer be a “spectacle,” and slowly we would find adequate language to present or express it. Of course,

we do not claim that we can describe it completely, but at least we could present its main characteristics. This shows that we could work out a kind of "meta-language" to express our feeling. Further, we claim that a meta-language is developed from our common feeling, and therefore that even the feeling of the sublime is not private or individual, but common.

Second, once we discover that we all possess the feeling of the sublime it is then a matter of how to express this feeling, a question of searching for a common language. Hence we can say our common experiences could be identified as what we call aesthetic feeling or aesthetic consciousness, while our common language is the result of our act of synthesizing, judging, cataloguing and categorizing these experiences. "Beauty" is the second stage, the more concrete and manifest face of the sublime.

It is not what Lyotard claims to be the antagonist of the sublime true. It may be true that aesthetic consciousness, that most of culture is shaped by means of "terror," "coercion," "violence," etc. in the world of the rulers. For if such an aesthetic consciousness is not accepted, i.e., felt, by the ruled then such experiences will vanish once the terror disappears. But that is not the case with regard to classical music, paintings or architecture. We still love the classics even when we are not manipulated, coerced, or terrorized. The love for classic art comes in fact from our common feeling. This means beauty is not simply a product of abstract categories, of a violent unification of experiences, but is rather a second stage of the sublime. The two faculties, to conceive and to present, are not in opposition, but in a permanent dialectical process of communication of arts.

From another point of view, however, we may say that Lyotard has seen in beauty, and quite rightly, its ideological nature. Criticism in the arts for example has taken the paradigms of beauty, which are constructed on rather abstract calculations, to determine the arts. Such a method is wrong, not because of the incorrectness of the paradigms, which are correct on their own terms, but rather because of an arbitrary "differentiation" between the sublime and beauty. The ideological essence of the classicism which sees beauty as its ultimate purpose is evident in its claim of foundationalism.

Consequently, classicism demands that its criteria or paradigms be the sole legitimate grounds for determining the arts. The point to which Lyotard may have rightly objected is the domination by the classic criteria and the fact that these criteria are arbitrarily constructed. Though we agree with this, we object to the

program of “de-differentiation” of Lyotard and Jacques Derrida (1930-) for its impossibility. To return to the sublime and rest in it is as utopian as it is nihilistic. The utopia and nihilism of Derrida and Lyotard are seen in their radical refusal to accept any kind of ideology, be it negative or positive, be it beauty or the meta-narratives. How can one conceive of arts, how does one understand them and how does one communicate them to others: these problems force us to accept the internal, dialectical relationship between the sublime and beauty, i.e. to accept a certain kind of positive ideology implicit in beauty.

To be more clear, we may describe the formation of the ideology of beauty as follows. In the first phase, we discover the sublime which is unexpressed and not presentable. The second phase would begin with a reflection on the sublime, and with the discovery of a common feeling of the sublime. The third phase is seen in the human effort to reduce, classify, and categorize the experiences of the sublime. Finally, beauty is constructed from such a process. That means, beauty is not randomly or arbitrarily constructed as Lyotard falsely accused, and that beauty bears an ideology of a positive rather than of a negative character. However, the concept of beauty could become negative in the course of a human change in aesthetic consciousness. That is, once we discover a new common feeling of the sublime, we need to work out a new concept of the beautiful. Failing to discover and to accept the historicity of aesthetic consciousness,⁴⁴ failing to see the relationship between the sublime and beauty as a certain dialectical relationship,⁴⁵ is to fall into the trap of negative ideology.

Reason and Ideology

The analysis of culture, morals, science and aesthetic consciousness supports our thesis that ideology, in its genetic process, bears both positive and negative aspects. Further, ideology is not constructed *a priori* as understood by the Platonists. Quite the contrary, it is constructed *a posteriori* from common human experiences. Its validity is tested by the degree of its effectiveness in solving human problems, in unmasking cosmic puzzles, in dealing with our difficulties, etc. By insisting on the *a posteriori* character of ideology, we go a step further to reject any kind of absolute, eternal, perfect ideology; we consider any such claim as absurd. Such a claim would transform a positive ideology into a negative one.

One may object to our understanding by accusing us of being the victim of another kind of ideology: that embraced by David Hume (1711-1776), Locke and especially the positivists. One may argue for the necessity of a certain kind of metaphysics, meta-language and meta-rules in language games and raise the question of how and why we come to the idea of a perfect, absolute, and eternal ideology if such an idea does not exist. The transcendentalism of knowledge proposed by Kant seems not quite successful in wiping out the meta-foundation as Heidegger has proved.⁴⁶ Kant might have been good at treating *metaphysica generalis* as transcendental philosophy, but he failed to do justice to *metaphysica specialis* with his transcendental method.⁴⁷

Thus, it appears that the question of meta-foundation is not yet solved or eliminated as the positivists have claimed. Our position is neither positivist nor empiricist in the strict sense. We acknowledge that we possess the idea of an absolute that we can hardly prove with experiences, but we challenge the idealists to prove its existence. It could be a purely psychological matter of our own human projection in the course of reflection about our own limits. Here, we will not go beyond our limits into pure speculation. It is sufficient to say that ideology is not quite a projection. It does not exist prior to man, but is the result of human activities. Hence, we can categorically deny that it is by nature absolute.

Before coming to our main issue, namely, the process of the transformation of ideology from the positive to the negative, we have to deal with the question of how a positive correct idea could become a negative "ideological" one. Marx's critique of ideology might be useful here in grasping a more adequate understanding of the nature of ideology.

FROM CORRECT IDEA TO INCORRECT IDEA

Marx's Critique of Ideology

The fact that almost all ideologues firmly believe that their theories are unique is nothing new. We all are tempted by the idea of an Archimedian point and are seduced easily by the irresistible meta-foundation which we name metaphysics, meta-philosophy or meta-sciences. In a word, the search for a foundation on which we build our knowledge (epistemology), construct our life (social theory), or regulate our conduct (morality) is a matter of fact. The point is whether there exists such an Archimedian point in praxis,

and how we discover and construct it. These two questions demand a thorough examination of the foundationalist claim. On the first question, it seems to most philosophers, including the empiricists, that a meta-narrative, meta-language, or meta-theory is possible. But in praxis, this is a matter of controversy. The failure of the Platonists, Kant and others in applying theory to the concrete world shows the great divergence between theory and praxis. By applying this to ideology, we may say that an ideology could be right in theory, but not necessarily valid in praxis.

Marx is not concerned with the question of foundation, but with the problem of how we discover, construct and apply the meta-theory. To Marx the discovery of ideology is by no means a matter of pure knowledge, but a way of defending the interests of a certain class. That means, ideology could be right, scientific, etc., only if its process of discovery, construction and application is scientific. Therefore, it is not our business to discuss ideology as such, but to criticize the process of ideologisation. Hence, Marx's main task is to examine (1) how ideology is constructed, i.e. the process of ideologisation, and (2) what kind of ideology is scientific, and therefore acceptable. Marx's analysis of the first question includes his critique of the phenomenon of alienation in religion, politics and economics, i.e., the three forms of ideology adopted by capitalism, while his work on a scientific theory which can satisfy the demand of the proletariat gives birth to a new ideology which his followers proudly christened Marxism. Louis Althusser (1918-1990) for example attempts to prove, with remarkable vigor, the scientific characteristics of Marx's ideology in its genetic process.⁴⁸ However, Althusser fails badly due to his mistake of taking ideology to be science. We will follow Marx's arguments to show that any form of ideology, even Marx's own, could not stand the test of historical change, and more fundamentally, the test of human development. Any form of ideology cannot claim the universality of humankind, but only the particularity of a class, a historical period, etc.

Ideology as False Consciousness

Marx's contradiction in holding the view of an ideology of the proletariat makes his ideological criticism hypocritical, even if the proletariat is understood as the classless, universal class. Here, we are not concerned with Marxism as a form of ideology, but with Marx's original position against any form of ideology.

In his earlier works, influenced by Hegel, Marx rejected any

form of ideology which he regarded as false, alienated, or a metaphysical distortion of reality. We will concentrate on Marx's understanding of ideology in this period. Up to 1844, Marx understood ideology in terms of religion and politics. Even if the term ideology does not appear in his earlier writings, the material elements of the future concept are already visible in his critique of religion, and in his objection to Hegel's concept of the state. To him, ideology was the inversion, the distortion of reality and finally, the alienation of man. He saw in religion, for example, an expression of the contradictions and sufferings of the real world. Following Ludwig Feuerbach (1804-1872), he claimed this to be the cause of alienation: "Religion is the fantastic realization of the human being, because the human being has attained no true reality."⁴⁹

Similarly, he criticized Hegel's concept of the state as the inversion of reality. The Hegelian political state was not the product of an illusory perception, but of a false construction of reality, or better, of an inversion of reality. In his *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, he expressed this idea as follows: The state and society produce religion "which is an inverted consciousness of the world, because they are an inverted world."⁵⁰

After his break with Feuerbach, Marx used for the first time the term ideology to attack the young Hegelians who, according to him, had not changed much from Hegel. They had replaced the Hegelian premise with their own, by forgetting that they were in no way combating the real, existing world.⁵¹ Actually, they still believed that the object of philosophy was consciousness and not the real social contradictions, as Marx affirmed. Thus, ideology meant a false consciousness built on a false basis was therefore negative.

After 1858, Marx rarely used the term ideology, though he developed it further and applied it in his analysis of the conditions and nature of the capitalist world. The texts of *Grundrisse* and *Capital* unmistakably show that ideology is meant as the distortion of the conditions and the nature of the value-exchange, and that such new forms of alienation as reification, fetishism, etc. are the logical consequence of the ideology of capitalism.⁵²

Ideology as a Form of Alienation

In sum, to Marx, ideology is not only a false consciousness: "Religious estrangement as such occurs only in the realm of consciousness, of man's inner life, but economic estrangement is that of real life..."⁵³ but also the consciousness of a class.⁵⁴ It is

not only a production of ideas, or representations such as religions or morals,⁵⁵ but also the distorted condition of our real life.⁵⁶ It is not only a simple illusion,⁵⁷ but also the abstraction of reality.⁵⁸

With these critiques, Marx clearly sees in the process of ideologization the decisive factor determining the nature of ideology. The ideology of the ruling class is born in (1) the process of commodization or fetishization, (2) the process of abstraction of labor (3) the way of defending their interests and (4) the form of exchange.⁵⁹

All these deform ideology into a negative force, distorting and inverting reality, suppressing the human capacity for self-discovery and reifying humans.

Ideology in Process

Marx's critique of ideology consists of two fundamental characteristics. First, ideology is not quite wrong in the first stage of the process of thinking, either with regard to a specific class, or in dealing with some particular problems. Religion, for example, appears quite plausible as a force of consolation, reaction, resentment against the brutality of the world, or as opium helping man to escape from reality. Specific politics may be helpful to a certain class, and so on. He said of religion: "Religious misery is on the one hand the expression of the real misery, and on the other hand, the protest against the real misery."⁶⁰ He then connected religion with politics, and economy: "The critique of the heaven transforms itself there with into the critique of the earth, the critique of religion into the critique of Rights, the critique of theology into the critique of politics."⁶¹

Second, the same ideology (religion, politics, economy) becomes wrong in the course of human history when: (a) it claims the universality of all human activities, (b) it overlooks the change of reality (social change, the growth of knowledge, etc.) and thus, no longer reflects reality, and (c) consequently, it distorts the real world and real human nature as in the case of Hegel's philosophy. That left Marx in a dubious and ambiguous position. On the one hand, he acknowledged the importance of ideology, but on the other hand he saw in it the danger of distortion, inversion and domination. Marx's attitudes encouraged his followers to construct an ideology which reflects history, reality and human nature (by means of a scientific analysis, as they boast).

Marx's Search for a Correct Idea

The search for a correct idea is the main focus of Marx's later works. His analysis of Capitalism and its mode of production,⁶² its distortion of economic reality by a process of circulation of capital,⁶³ its forms of the process as a whole⁶⁴ and his reconstruction of the history of capitalism⁶⁵ show that he was laboring at a scientific, correct, socially conscious ideology even though he disliked the word. We may venture to say that, having dismissed other forms of ideology, the young Marx was not content with a pure critique. He went a step forward in constructing the correct idea. When Marx declared that "religion, family, state, law, morality, science, art, etc., are only particular modes of production, and fall under its general law," he intended to break down these particular modes and build a universal idea which he then identified as "communism": "Communism is the positive transcendence of private property, as human self-estrangement, and therefore as the real appropriation of the human essence, by and for, man. Communism therefore is the complete return of man to himself as a social being—a return which becomes conscious, and is accomplished within the entire wealth of previous development."⁶⁶

Needless to say, his followers took his writings for granted, and interpreted them word by word. Their main task seems to have been limited to elaborating the scientific character of Marx's idea,⁶⁷ applying it to a concrete world (Lenin), and, ironically, forcing people to believe in it. From Marx, and against his will, a new ideology is born: communism, the ideology of the 20th century.

The Marxist Paradox

Marx was not the first man to engage in such an enterprise. In fact, almost all great thinkers did so. The story of philosophy is the narrative of their struggle against Platonism. But, tragically, they are unable to break its grip. What they could do, and indeed have done, is blame their fellow philosophers on the one hand, and build a new version of Platonism on the other hand. The story of Nietzsche who tried to destroy Platonism but remained Platonian is true with regard to Marx, Heidegger and even Popper. Therefore, we can conclude that humans are obsessed with the idea of "the correct idea" and that one tries to discover it mainly by a critique of "the incorrect idea." We follow this tenet by looking for the key to open the black box of how a correct idea becomes incorrect, and

consequently how we can judge its correctness. We will treat the question from the pragmatic,⁶⁸ theoretical and metaphysical perspectives.

TOWARD AN UNDERSTANDING OF IDEOLOGY

Before explaining ideology in its three aspects, namely, pragmatic, theoretical and progressive, we need to say something about Marx's attitude toward ideology. There is no doubt that Marx has made a decisive contribution to a more correct understanding of ideology, even if he treated it from a negative aspect. For the first time since De Tracy, one discovers with Marx the negative, dangerous, ugly face of ideology. However, Marx contradicts himself in proclaiming communism an absolute ideology, a mistake easily detected in his inconsistency. He seems to abandon his commitment to the dynamic, progressive and emancipatory nature of man for his dogma of the final stage of social development, the stage of communism. Actually, his first critique of German idealism demands the abolition of any form of determinism, thus the perplexity in explaining why he embraces the idea of communism. If he held to his idea of human development, he would have rejected the idea of the proletariat as the ultimate ideology.

We follow Marx's ideological critique, but stand in an opposite position. We contend that ideology is correct in its first stage. However, it will become incorrect and hence negative in the course of human history due to: (1) newly emerging human activities, new interests and, therefore, new problems (pragmatic aspect); (2) new knowledge as well as new puzzles, and consequently a demand for new solutions (theoretical aspect); and (3) human aspiration for emancipation (progressive aspect) and perfection (metaphysical aspect). Unlike Marx, we have no ambition to discover a new theory or ideology to replace the old ones. Our aim is more modest: we wish to explore the nature of ideology by finding the line between the negative and the positive and to understand the reason for such a transformation or deformation, which we recognize as natural and permanent.

The Genetic Process of Ideology - The Pragmatic Aspect

We begin with the pragmatic aspect of ideology. Ideology is not constructed from a pure idea. It is born first in the process of the human search for solutions to practical problems. In the first part, examining various aspects of ideology such as culture, morals

and arts, we discovered a common characteristic explaining ideology: the pragmatic aspect of problem-solving. All cultures, morals, arts, etc. are various modes of problem-solving which have been sufficiently successful in solving conflicts. Morals deal with practical problems arising from the conflict of practical interests. Culture deals generally with social and communicative problems; it tries to establish patterns and models for avoiding conflicts and constructing common regulations. The arts, a special aspect of culture, are often taken to be the medicine of the soul, or regarded as a force of emancipation, etc.

From this fundamental thesis, we come to the second thesis, namely, that an idea is correct as long as it is effective, i.e., valuable or usable, that is, if it can solve at least some problem. Failing to meet this requirement, it is no longer valuable or effective, but becomes incorrect. However, precisely here we encounter an epistemological problematic: how do we know or judge the correctness of our act or of a thing. To Max Weber (1864-1920), the correctness or the validity of our action is measured by the degree of achievement of the set purpose. But what happens if even the purpose is in a permanent changing state? The classic definition of correctness (truth) in terms of the adequacy of knowledge and (static) thing would be inapplicable to the living (dynamic) person.⁶⁹ Hence, we understand correctness in terms of effectiveness in solving our problems. Like Popper, we contend that since human problems are in a permanent emerging state, the solution of a problem is not the final purpose (because such a solution will appear obsolete when one changes, or once the problems disappear or reappear in other forms). We accept Popper's view that solutions are to be upgraded by means of permanent testing. Therefore, the concept of validity or effectiveness can be accepted if it stands up to the test. That means, effectiveness cannot be determined or calculated *a priori*, but is generated from *ad hoc* tests which in their turn are needed for *ad hoc* problems. This kind of pragmatics is built rather *ad hoc* solutions. Thus, the difference between theory and praxis could be formulated as follows: while in theory we need some transcendental schemata in advance that we later test; in praxis, the thesis and solution are mainly generated in an *ad hoc* manner. To a peasant, his *ad hoc* problem would be how to produce needed food and materials. He is not much concerned with the ideas of exchange of production, surplus, deficit, etc. His test is the sufficiency of food. The quota depends not on the demand of the market, but on his family's needs, and the way of handling or

managing work and household. His method is sound if he is succeeding in meeting the demands, needs or quota he set. Failing to reach the aim, his method or ideas turn out to be wrong. He must revise his way of handling the matter; he needs a new idea. Even his needs are not completely known or determined *a priori*. Most needs come unexpectedly, due to newly emerging problems, discoveries, etc. The need for tools for plowing or harvesting is a fundamental need because it is a *conditio sine qua non*, but a tractor comes to his mind only if the peasant intends to mass-produce products for the market. In sum, besides basic needs or interests for our life in the wider sense, most human needs, and hence problems, emerge *a posteriori* in an *ad hoc* manner.

The Linguistic Model

Satisfying basic needs is often problematic. The history of the human search for solutions dealing with its basic interests and needs forms an important part of human history. In order to find the right solution, one needs first to understand basic human interests and the reason for the conflicts arising from these interests. If with Marx, we could say that pragmatic problems are economic, while with Habermas, communicative, then the search for ideology is a search for the most effective solution to the problems of economic and communicative activities. To Marx, the main reasons for social conflicts, class-division and reification are the unequal and unreasonable distribution of wealth and the build-up of artificial needs and interests. Such inequality is justified by the ideology of the dominant class. Therefore, Marx demands the total abolition of the capitalist system of distribution and, more importantly, its ideology. At the same time, he works out a new "reasonable," "correct" idea based on the most fundamental human power, i.e. labor, with which one distributes wealth in accordance with the principle "from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs."⁷⁰

Habermas develops Marx's view in a more complete version. For him, the economic factor is undeniably important, but to reduce all human activities to the single aspect of *homo labor* is to commit the fallacy of reductionism and simplicity. The practical aspects of human activities are not only economic but also moral, political and aesthetic. In short, one is searching for a total solution that is communicative in character.⁷¹ The ideology which we seek is linguistic and quasi-transcendental. However, he also acknowledges

that such a model has to be upgraded, implemented, and in some cases, negated. A model based on human communicative action could serve as a positive ideology; but it could become negative if it is not "transcended" (*aufgehoben*), for like any linguistic model it could become obsolete once it no longer reflects reality.

Like Marx's ideology, Habermas's theory of communication consists of:

(1) a critique of negative ideology, i.e. a critique of obsolete linguistic models or language-games and their distorted conditions which hinder a normal speech-situation. Such a critique is applied not only to super-structural models such as religion and morals, but also to such infra-structural models as economics. The aim of criticism is to discover unreal, biased and distorted conditions, to unmask the domination of ideology, and to dig out the hidden power which dictates our social conduct such as the Freudian *libido*, the Nietzschean *Will-to-Power*, the Marxian *labor*. Any criticism thus has a double function: to eliminate the negative force and to rediscover the positive one.

(2) The second step in his model of communication is to work out a model based on a consensus of power, interests and needs, which is best seen in language. The linguistic model has a decisive advantage in explaining a new model free of negative ideology: it is both transcendental and empirical, both consensual and reflective, and it is not necessarily rigid in interpretation. From another point of view, the linguistic model offers a relatively free and less oppressive consensus. The partners involved in a communication must sincerely open, agree on a starting condition (consensus), and work towards a new consensus.⁷²

In sum, in many ways the models for solving economic and communicative conflicts offered by Marx and Habermas are worthy of discussion. Such models could be taken as positive ideology if they are effective, i.e., if they can solve our economic and communicative problems. Marxist ideology has shown some promise in the past in contributing to the realization of a more equal and self-conscious society. But it has failed miserably in addressing human economic problems and therefore has failed as a definitive solution. Habermas's theory of communicative actions is not yet an ideology, because its effectiveness has not yet been tested. Actually, it will have a hard time becoming an ideology for a great number of reasons such as (1) its theory must be proven on an epistemological level; (2) it has to be put into practice (and that will be difficult because Habermas lacks the political power of a Vladimir I. U. Lenin (1870-

1924), or a Mao Dze-dung (1893-1976); and (3) it has to be popularized or simplified for the masses (a task almost impossible with Habermas's obscure and difficult style).

The Problem of Meaningfulness

On the theoretical level, an idea is correct: (1) as long as it corresponds to reality, (2) when it expresses the sameness of a thing, (3) when it stands the test of certainty and consistency, or (4) when it becomes universally and necessarily valid. In a word, to most philosophers, a correct idea or a correct proposition must be a scientific idea, or better, a mathematical idea or proposition. That means, a positive ideology must stand fast on the theoretical level too. The ideologies of scientism, positivism and even Marxism are understood to claim for themselves scientific character and therefore universal validity. Scientism is the belief in the magic power of science, claiming for itself the role of Messiah (as the Enlightenment boasted) who can solve all problems once and for all. Thus, the Enlightenment was sure that humankind would only improve and progress. Positivism follows suit by declaring that truth must be built on a kind of logical certainty: only what we can prove is true and therefore real. These ideologies follow strictly the categories of tautology, certainty and consistency and successfully demonstrate their scientific characters of universality and necessity. They neglect to note that their claim of universality and necessity must be tested too, and not by the criteria of consistency, tautology or anything else, but by its effectiveness. Before critiquing such an ideology, one has to accept the fact that if the correct idea is unchallenged, and if it produces a satisfying result, it will become *de facto* an ideology regardless of our human reaction, etc.

We will develop further our thesis that even a theoretical idea must be tested for its degree of effectiveness. The meaningfulness of life is not identical with that of a mathematical proposition. Similarly, the acceptance of a (scientific) theory is not necessarily dependent on its truth. If the truth of a mathematical proposition is verified by an equation, i.e. by a tautology, then the meaning of life is verified by its effects. The mathematical truth is "meaningful" *for us* only if its truth can affect our life, and it would be *taken* if it can affect our life. The devastating effect of the atomic bomb proves not only the correct calculations of quantum physics, but also its terrifying utility in winning the war (or keeping the peace). Similarly, the discovery of the neutron, proton or quark

is appreciated if it helps us to understand the mystery of our universe. It would be more appreciated if it could be of use for a certain purpose. In sum, the effectiveness of a theory (in the human sciences) is the main criterion deciding the correctness of ideology.

Of course, we acknowledge a difference of degree of effectiveness between pure and practical sciences. However, our point is, science is by no means purely theoretical, because it is concerned with human knowledge (Habermas). It would not be appreciated if it had nothing to do with human life. Furthermore, the two characters, universal and necessary, to science can be understood also in terms of universal pragmatics (Habermas). A proposition, say a logical proposition such as “the King of France is bald” is true (universal) but meaningless (not necessary) to a Chinese peasant, simply because it has no-thing to do with the peasant. The idea of a pure science, fully free of interests is hardly accepted by most of us today. To such post-modernists as Michel Foucault (1926-84), Roland Barthes (1915-1980), Derrida and Lyotard, there could be no pure knowledge because science is meant for problem-solving.⁷³ That means, a pure ideology is impossible. This impossibility is evident in the incompetence and arrogance of scientism, our modern ideology. We may with certainty say that while science could help us solve our problems, scientism would, at its best, bring us back to the world of mythology. By putting more emphasis on the usefulness or the practicality of science, we are by no means playing against science, or denying its theoretical certainty. In fact, our aim is to distinguish science as such from science as ideology (scientism). The line which determines the difference is the claim of absolute power, and consequently that of domination. Science aims at solving our problems while scientism wants to dictate every aspect of our life. The latter proclaims itself to be the modern god. In other words, while science is set against any form of determinism, scientism takes determinism as its soul.

Progress as Metaphysical Principle

The Enlightenment proclaimed itself to be the age of progress, happiness and reason. Its claim has been proven partly true, but mostly wrong. It is true that we are developing more today, but it is impossible to assert that we are happier. We cannot even affirm that we are more rational than our predecessors, though we have relied more intensively on reason than ever before. The naivete of the Enlightenment is seen in that: (1) it reduced human progress to

scientific progress, and in doing so it ignored the role of the subject; (2) it saw progress only in terms of the accumulation of knowledge, but not in terms of problem-solving; (3) it mistakenly identified happiness with progress and progress with reason. These are in fact three different, but related, aspects of human life. However, its biggest error was to ignore the antinomy between determinism and progress. To regard science as the decisive factor is to lay our fate in its cold hand. To believe in the absolute power of science is to divorce humanism and to refuse human progress.

In the following lines we seek to show that human progress is not identified with scientific progress, and that while the latter may help the first, it cannot determine it. First, scientific progress can be measured and thus predicted, as is evident in its own products such as technology. A civilized man with the most comfortable surroundings is far different from a primitive, uncivilized man as can be measured by their tools, surroundings, way of problem-solving, etc. Using a washing machine is more civilized than using our hands. However, human progress cannot be measured in terms of the things we use. Owning a car or traveling by plane does not mean human or social progress. One cannot translate scientific progress into human progress without understanding the role of science in human life. The fact that we cannot escape misery shows the great difference between human progress and scientific progress.

Second, technical and scientific progress cannot dictate our happiness. Technical and scientific progress has not made us happier. On the contrary, the two world wars were more or less the result of the over-confident and abusive attitude of scientists and politicians. Thus, we can say, scientific progress has a neutral function. It could further human progress, but it could also destroy it. In a word, an ideology is of use if it furthers human progress, but becomes negative if it hinders or destroys it. Any form of absolute ideology such as scientism tends more toward the negative because of its determinism, which means that it leaves no room for other possibilities. It tries to render humans one-dimensional and to return them to Plato's cave. In short, all forms of negative ideology always bear certain deterministic and conservative characteristics, a point Habermas has discussed brilliantly.⁷⁴

Ideology in Reconstruction

We have discussed so far the three main aspects of human life which may serve as provisory criteria to judge the positive or

negative character of an ideology. However, they are far from complete. In the following points, we wish to add more criteria deduced from the pragmatic, theoretical and progressive aspects.

In a previous work,⁷⁵ we attempted to describe ideology in a Kantian manner, namely, from the scientific aspect. Such a description is inadequate because it is based on the dichotomy of truth and falsehood, which is of no use in dealing with practical human problems. They appear incompetent in treating emancipative or progressive human activities. This means that the scientific language-game could not be fully applied to other activities. We may need other language-games to deal with practical activities. Thus, we turn to Marx's progressive, or better, productive criteria.

The Marxian model has some advantage in dealing with our concrete life, but as it leaves no room for the dynamic force of emancipation, it hinders, instead of helping, our life. Hence, we revised the Marxian approach, and adopted a more balanced attitude toward ideology,⁷⁶ for ideology must be understood from all three fundamental aspects: pragmatic, theoretical and progressive. The multi-dimensional character of human life reveals its openness towards new activities and hence new models or new language-games. For the sake of discussion, we tentatively classify these as: pragmatic, theoretical and progressive. If truth and falseness belongs to the scientific and logical language-game, then rightness and wrongness should be the language of pragmatics or practical activities. Similarly, we venture to say the same about the language of the third aspect of human life: openness and closedness (Popper), emancipation and conservatism (Habermas), hope and despair (Ernst Bloch), salvation and slavery (Judeo-Christian tradition), and so on.

Ideology should be treated from its two functions: positive and negative. Positive ideology strives for correctness in ideas (scientific), in common sense or commonality (practical), and in human aspiration (emancipative). Negative ideology resists change and wants to maintain the *status quo*, to totalize all human activities under its domination, and to generalize its power beyond its limit. It is also important to note the dialectical relationship between the positive and the negative, and the negative and the positive. Ideology could also be studied from the point of view of its deterministic seduction, and the human resistance to being seduced. In short, ideology could and should be treated from a more global perspective, i.e., from the total aspect of human life.

The Criteria of Ideology

The following are the main criteria deduced from the three main aspects of human activities:

- In the pragmatic (practical) aspects, the criteria of correctness—incorrectness, rightness—wrongness, effectiveness—ineffectiveness, and validity-invalidity often are taken to differentiate positive from negative ideology.

- In the theoretical aspects, the criteria of truth-falseness, universal-particular, necessity-non-necessity, and consistency-inconsistency are used to differentiate the scientific (the positive) from the unscientific (the negative).

- In the progressive aspects, openness-closeness, emancipation-conservatism, salvation-slavery, hope-despair (nihilism), and development-backwardness, may serve as the criteria to judge the positive or the negative character of an ideology.

We may also adopt the criteria of power, domination, freedom, democracy, etc. to study ideology as in Marx's concept of ideology and Mannheim's elaboration of a sociology of knowledge based on ideology, the criteria of power, domination, and freedom. These are of undeniable importance in understanding our present ideology. One can formulate ideology as a system of power, which seeks to rally force to defend the interests of a community, to support its members or to further their growth. This is a positive ideology. However, the same ideology could become negative when it seeks domination instead of a self-preserving force. A negative ideology aims not at the community, but at power as such; it tries to dominate the community and, as such, negates the freedom and the development of the individual. It expands its power to other areas of human life and mobilizes all human activities. This expansionism results in such modern forms of ideology as Nazism, fascism, imperialism, colonialism, communism, etc. Consequently, any social system or social structure that is rigid in character, coercive, manipulative or doctrinaire in education such as fascism, militarism, etc. would fall into the category of negative ideology.

We may judge ideology from its dialectical nature implicit in the history of human development and intellectual growth. If in history, our ideas are enriched by an *Aufhebung*, i.e., a process of abrogation (negation), preservation and elevation of our concrete experiences,⁷⁷ then in intellectual development we learn by

mistakes.⁷⁸ The dialectical movement of history requires first an affirmation, then a negation and finally a new synthesis of our experiences. Each moment is represented by a certain idea, while each historical moment is represented by a certain ideology. This means that each ideology is both positive and negative. It is positive in the moment of affirmation (thesis), while negative in the second movement of negation (antithesis). In the first moment, it is correct because it represents the commonality of a historical period (Hegel), or an historical class (Marx). In the second phase, it becomes incorrect due to the change of reality and hence the change of history. It degrades into a kind of false consciousness (Marx), or a reactionary force (Lenin).

CONCLUDING REMARKS

This short and sketchy description of ideology is, of course, insufficient in many aspects for a number of reasons:

First, ideology itself is changing. The genetic process of ideology bears remarkable resemblance to the birth of an idea, though it is much more complex and rich. Like an idea, it presents the view not only of an individual or a class, but also of a world, a history and even of human fate (as seen in Nietzsche's *amor fati*, or in Messianism). However, unlike an idea, ideology manifests its power only if it is taken up by a society, class, or at least a strong individual (leader). Thus, there is need to investigate the question of power, the form in which it manifested, the way of acquiring power, and the relationship between power and social structure. Mannheim has done excellent work in his *Ideology and Utopia*, which we do not need to repeat.

Second, the progressive aspect of ideology has not been explored. The works of Bloch and Ricoeur have shed some light on it, but, like the Freudian *libido*, this aspect should be given a more important place. Utopia is not simply a dream like a unnecessary and toxic opium, but expresses human desire for a positive ideology. It may be the force behind human progress.

Thus, unlike Marx, we do not claim, that we have to reject all kinds of ideology, or that we have to build an absolute ideology such as the communism dreamed of by Marx himself. Such an ideology is easily shattered by a Prague Spring (1968), or earlier by the Budapest tragedy (1956), or more recently by the *Tienanmen* events (1989). In sum, ideology has a role to play if it reflects reality, defends common interests, and furthers human progress; that is, ideology is

positive if it is effective (valuable) — otherwise, it is destined to be rejected and replaced by a new one. Thus, we acknowledge the existence of a positive ideology, though we are aware of the fact that most ideologies fall into the second negative category. However, we do not suggest a total abandonment of all ideologies. It is naive and irresponsible to break down Confucianism, or whatever, and throw it away as did the members of the May-Fourth Movement and the communist leaders in the Cultural Revolution. Any ideology is the expression of a historical moment, which may still have impact on our present condition. This is true with regard to our culture in general and to morality in particular.

NOTES

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² Lee Hong-yung, *The Politics of the Chinese Cultural Revolution: A Case Study* (California: University of California Press, 1978); Joseph A. William, Christine Wong P. W., and David Zweig, *New Perspectives on the Cultural Revolution* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991).

³ Hu Shi-ming and Eli Seifman, eds., *Toward a New World Outlook: A Documentary History of Education in the People's Republic of China 1949-1976* (AMS Press, 1976); Peter Seybolt, *Revolutionary Education in China: Documents and Commentary*, rev. ed. (International Arts & Sciences Press, 1973).

⁴ Francis Bacon, *Novum Organum* (London, 1620).

⁵ Karl Marx, *Die deutsche Ideologie* (1845/46), in *MEW* 3, p. 46; *MEW* 4, p. 480; *Zur Kritik der Politischen Oekonomie* (1857), in *MEW* 13, p. 632.

⁶ Louis Althusser, *For Marx* (Hammondsworth, 1969); also in "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses," in *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays* (London, 1971).

⁷ Karl Marx, *Die deutsche Ideologie* (1845-46), in *MEW* 3, p. 20.

⁸ Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia* (London, 1936).

⁹ Paul Ricoeur, *Lectures on Ideology and Utopia* (New York, 1986).

¹⁰ Daniel Bell, *The End of Ideology* (New York, 1960).

¹¹ Francis Bacon, *Novum Organum*, I, 38-68. According to Bacon, there are four types of idols: 1) idols of the tribe, 2) idols of

the cave or den, 3) idols of the market place, and 4) idols of the theater.

¹² Etienne Bonnet de Condillac, *Treatise on Sensations*, trans. G. Carr (London: Favel, 1930), I, iii, p. 1.

¹³ A. L. Claude Destutt de Tracy, *Elements d'ideologie* (1801-1815), 4 vols.; Claude A. Helvetius, *De l'homme, de ses facultes et de son education* (1772), trans. by Hooper: *On Man* (1777), I, p. 127.

¹⁴ Pierre J. G. Cabanis, *Rapport du physique et du moral de l'homme*, in *Oeuvres*, ed. Thurot (Paris 1823-25). Cabanis' famous slogan: "Les nerfs - voila tout l'homme."

¹⁵ Plato, *Politeia* and *Republic*, books 2-4, in Plato's *Works*; Taylor, *Plato, the Man and His Works* (New York, 1929), 3d ed., pp. 393-407. See also Paul Shorey, ed., *What Plato Said* (Illinois: University of Chicago Press, 1933), pp. 216 ff.

¹⁶ Karl Popper, *Conjectures and Refutations* (New York: Harper and Row, 1968).

¹⁷ Richard Bernstein, *Beyond Objectivism and Relativism* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1985), pp. 87 ff. See also Keneth Baynes, James Bohman and Thomas McCarthy, eds., *After Philosophy - End or Transformation* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1987). Karl Popper, *The Open Society and Its Enemies* (London, 1951).

¹⁸ Edmund Husserl, *Die Krisis der europaischen Wissenschaften und die Transzendente Phanomenologie* (1936), in *Husserliana* (1954), vol. 6 (ed. Walter Biemel); Kurt Godel, "On Formally Undecidable Proposition of Principia Mathematica and Related Systems," in Ernest Nagel and James R. Newman, *Godel's Proof* (New York: New York University Press, 1960). According to Godel's theorem, the incompleteness of arithmetic implies that there is no sound formal system in which arithmetical truth is deducible. Against Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russel, Godel demonstrates that there is no consistent formal system in which mathematical truth is provable. See S. Shanker, ed., *Godel's Theorem in Focus* (London, 1988).

¹⁹ Peter Winch, *The Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy* (London: 1958)

²⁰ Carl G. Hempel, "Formulation and Formalization of Scientific Theories," in Frederic Suppe, ed., *The Structure of Scientific Theories* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1979, second ed.), pp. 244-254.

²¹ Karl Popper, *Conjectures and Refutations*, p. 37: "One

can sum up all this by saying that the *criterion of the scientific status of a theory is its falsifiability, or refutability, or testability.*"

²² Josif V. Stalin, *Works* (13 vols.) (1952-1955), especially *The Foundations of Leninism* (1924); See also Robert Tucker, *Stalinism* (1977).

²³ *Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions* (Cambridge, 1952).

²⁴ See Chu-Yen, "Hsiao dao" (Filial Piety), in *Chung guo Wen hua Lwen wen Chi*, (Collected Essays on Chinese Culture), ed. Department of Philosophy, Tung Hai University (Taipei: You Shi, 1979) pp. 182 ff.

²⁵ Tseng Chiao-hsuy, "Hsiao dao yu Dzung chiao" (Filial Piety and Religion), in *Chung guo Wen hua Lwen wen Chi*, vol. 3, ed. by The Department of Philosophy, Tung Hai University (Taipei: You Shi, 1981), pp. 512-22.

²⁶ Yu An-bang, "Qing Yi Lwen shu" ("On Affection and Righteousness"), in *Newsletter for Research in Chinese Studies* (Taipei: Center of Chinese Studies, 2001), no. 78, pp. 9-26.

²⁷ This conception of moral is the kernel of moral theories such as utilitarianism, consequentialism and decisionism.

²⁸ Karl Marx, *Das Elend der Philosophie*. See Hans J. Sandkuhler, ed., *Marxismus und Ethik* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. 1975). See also L. Laurat, *Marxism and Democracy*, p. 16; Karl Popper, *The Open Society and Its Enemies*, p. 391.

²⁹ See Tran Van Doan, *The Formation of Vietnamese Confucianism* (Washington, D.C.: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 2001), chap. "What Can Be Called Tradition?"

³⁰ Tran Van Doan, "Filial Piety and the Cult of Ancestors," in *Triet Dao*, No. 2, (Washington, D.C., October, 2001).

³¹ Max Horkheimer & Theodor Adorno, *The Dialectic of Enlightenment* (Boston: Continuum, 1973), p. 7.

³² Karl Popper, *Conjectures and Refutations*, p. 36.

³³ Jurgen Habermas, "Technology and Science as Ideology" in *Toward a Rational Society* (London, 1971).

³⁴ Popper, p. 37.

³⁵ See the critique of J. Habermas, "A Positivistically Bisected Rationalism," in Theodor Adorno, ed., *The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology* (London, 1973), pp. 198-225.

³⁶ Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, (Chicago, 1970), 2nd. ed.

³⁷ Paul Feyerabend, *Against Method: Outline of an An-*

archistic Theory of Knowledge (London: NLB, 1975), pp. 83, 98 ff.

³⁸ Imre Lakatos, *Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), p. 2.

³⁹ Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, pp. 12 ff.

⁴⁰ Habermas' objection to Gadamer's thesis is grounded on his confusion between positive and negative ideology. ,

⁴¹ Nietzsche with the works: *Genealogy of Morals* and *The Birth of Tragedy*, etc.

⁴² Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgement*, trans. J. C. Meredith (Oxford, 1969).

⁴³ Francois Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*, trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi (University of Manchester Press, 1984), pp. 77-79.

⁴⁴ Georg Lukacs, *A Theory of Novel* (1911).

⁴⁵ Walter Benjamin, "Theses on the Philosophy of History" and Jurgen Habermas, *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity* (1985).

⁴⁶ Martin Heidegger, *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik* (1931) (Pfullingen: Klosterman, 1982).

⁴⁷ Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* (1929), trans. Norman Kemp Smith, p. 662.

⁴⁸ Louis Althusser, *Pour Marx* (Paris, 1965); English translation (Hammondsworth, 1969); *Lire Capital* (with Etienne Balibar), (Paris 1970).

⁴⁹ *The German Ideology*, pp. 131, 137.

⁵⁰ *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, Introduction.

⁵¹ *The German Ideology*, vol. 1, (1845-6).

⁵² *Capital*, vol. 1, chap. 6.

⁵³ *Manuscript*, 1844, p. 136.

⁵⁴ *MEW* 3, 46.

⁵⁵ *MEW* 3 26f., *MEW* 21, p. 179.

⁵⁶ *Zur Kritik der Politischen Okonomie*, Vorwort, 1859, *MEW* 13, p. 9.

⁵⁷ *MEW* 13, p. 632 .

⁵⁸ *Grundrisse* , 1857-58, p. 81f.

⁵⁹ *Das Kapital*, *MEW* 23, p. 87.

⁶⁰ *Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie*. Introduction, 1843-44. In *MEW* 1, p. 378.

⁶¹ *MEW* 1, pp. 378f.

⁶² *Capital*, vol. 1.

⁶³ *Capital*;, vol. 2.

⁶⁴ *Capital*, vol. 3.

⁶⁵ The planned vol. 4.

⁶⁶ *Manuscript*, 1844, p. 135.

⁶⁷ Louis Althusser, *Reading Capital*, Introduction.

⁶⁸ We understand pragmatics in a sense much broader than that of John Dewey and William James. In our view, pragmatics is concerned with problem-solving. But the problems could be meta-physical (principle), theoretical, religious, etc. and not necessarily restricted to daily practical problems. Juergen Habermas understands (universal) pragmatics as an effort to "identify and reconstruct universal conditions of possible understanding." In other words, he treats universal pragmatics as a meta-theory. See Juergen Habermas, "What is Universal Pragmatics?" in *Communication and the Evolution of Society*, trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1979), p. 1.

⁶⁹ Actually, correctness is not identified with truth. In our view, truth belongs to the theoretical category while correctness to the practical category. Our critique of ideology centers on its hasty identification of correctness with truth, truth of the static world with truth of the living human world, etc.

⁷⁰ *Manifesto of the Communist Party* (1848): "Jeder nach seinen Faehigkeiten, jedem nach seinem Beduerfnissen."

⁷¹ Jurgen Habermas, "What is Universal Pragmatics?" p. 1; See also Jurgen Habermas, *A Theory of Communicative Action*, 2 vols., trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon, 1985).

⁷² Jurgen Habermas, "What is Universal Pragmatics?" pp. 2, 65.

⁷³ J. F. Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition*, op. cit., pp. 44-45.

⁷⁴ Juergen Habermas, "Modernity versus Post-modernity" and *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*, trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1987).

⁷⁵ Tran Van Doan, "Ideology, Interests and Morality," op. cit., p. 123.

⁷⁶ *ibid.* See also "The Danger of Self-Deception in Ideological Education" (London, 1990), op. cit.; chap. 4 in this volume.

⁷⁷ G. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807); and Popper, "What is Dialectic?" in *Conjectures and Refutations*, op. cit.

⁷⁸ Karl Popper, *Conjectures and Refutations*, Introduction, p. 1.